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ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATIONS, ZONING, AND WITHHELD
MUNICIPAL SERVICES: TAKINGS OF PROPERTY
BY MULTI-GOVERNMENT ACTION

CHARis E. HARRIS*
Like many regions of the nation, Florida is in the midst of a pitched battle
to save its environment. After decades of phlegmatically ignoring the interrelationship between growth and environmental degradation, governmental
concern over land use has blossomed swiftly and pervasively.1 Legal controls
on property subdivision and sanitation facilities are increasing.2 Statewide
zoning and land-use planning are moving closer to reality.8
Yet each new barrage of long overdue legislation restricts the property
owner's freedom to use his land for certain purposes. Many of the resulting
limitations have the admirable effect of forcing the property owner to internalize environmental costs presently borne by society.4 Other legislative
encroachments so severely restrict property rights that some owners face substantial obstacles in making any developed use of their land. In some instances,
regulatory schemes passed by several levels of government have combined to
effect unconstitutional takings of property.
The need for determining when various types of government action constitute a taking of property has become profound. Florida's Environmental
Land and Water Management Act of 19725 provides one example. Section
380.08(1) recognizes possible constitutional repercussions from environmental
restrictions imposed by the law and cautions that the Act does not authorize
any governmental agency to adopt a rule or regulation or issue an order that
is "unduly restrictive or constitutes a taking of property" without "the payment of full compensation" if doing so would violate the Florida or United
States Constitutions. 6 The Act, however, fails to enunciate the point at which
A.B. 1969, University of Florida; J.D. 1972, Harvard University; Member of The
Florida Bar.

1. See generally L. JAFFEE & L. TRIBE, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTeCTION (1971); J. SAX, DEFENDING THE ENVIRONMENT: A STRATEGY FOR CITIZEN ACTION (1971); U.S. DEP'T OF INTERIOR,
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT OF THE BIG CYPREss SwAmP JETPORT 73 (1969); Cornwell, From

Whence Cometh Our Help? Conservationists'Search for a Judicial Forum for Environmental
Relief, 23 U. FLA. L. REV. 451 (1971); Juergensmeyer, The American Legal System and Environmental Pollution, 23 U. FLA. L. REv. 439 (1971); Little, New Attitudes About Legal
Protection for the Remains of Florida'sNatural Environment, 23 U. FLA. L. REV. 459 (1971).
2. See, e.g., ORANGE COUNTY, FLA., CODE ch. 82 (1971), enacted as Fla. Special Acts 1959,
ch. 1646 and Fla. Special Acts 1965, ch. 2274; ORLANDO, FIA., CITY CODE ch. 35A (1971).

3. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ch. 380 (Supp. 1972); cf. HAWAII REV. STAT. §205-2 (Supp. 1970).
4.
5.

See notes 175-178 infra and accompanying text.
FLA. STAT. ch. 380 (Supp. 1972).

6. Id. §8.
[635]
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governmental action becomes so restrictive or constitutes such a taking as to
require payment of compensation. That the legislation may have justifiably
left this determination to the judiciary does not assist those who must decide
whether a particular environmental restriction requires compensation. Court
decisions in the area of inverse condemnation are often vague, conflicting, and
without pattern. Worse, governmental restrictions in the environmental area
pose special problems unanswered by precedent. Basic compensation theories
are not easily applied to situations in which the actions of several levels of
government merge to prevent an owner from making any reasonable use of his
land. Apportioning financial and administrative responsibility for such multilevel taking exacerbates the dilemma. Additional questions are raised where
the allegedly improper governmental actions consist of the abandonment or
withholding of essential municipal services such as sewage treatment.
Asserting that certain environmental regulations may effect a taking of
property, however, is not intended to suggest that a developer should be allowed to escape his fair share of the cost of controlling pollution. If subdividers and entrepreneurs are forced to bear unforeseeable and inordinate
expenses in procuring land and planning improvements, these costs will only
be passed on to the homeowner and apartment dweller. But again, this does
not mean that developers should avoid a share of the costs associated with
environmental protection. The question concerns the amount of expense that
a developer should be required to bear. Governmental restrictions which effect
a taking of property without just compensation force an individual landowner
to bear an economic burden that our constitutional heritage says must be
shared by the community at large. If the community is unwilling to bear its
share of the cost of protecting the environment, the constitutional solution is
not to shackle an individual citizen with an unfair part of the community's
burden; rather, the answer is to let the environment go unprotected. Only
after the full social cost of a given environmental program is known can an
appropriate political judgment concerning the advisability of that program be
made. Recognition of the instances in which a regulatory scheme effects a
taking of property helps delineate the program costs that must be borne by
society.
Once such an attribution is made, society may choose to cancel the program
or bear its share of the expense through any of several methods. For example,
the landowner may be paid just compensation for the loss of all reasonable
use of his property. Alternatively, the government may choose to repeal the
laws prohibiting use of individual sewage treatment facilities. Further, the
municipality may decide to extend the public sewer lines to the restricted
property. In other instances the local government may alleviate the impact of
the restriction by re-zoning the property to allow some reasonable land use
that would not require sewage disposal facilities. The choice of alternatives is
essentially political, although factors such as technology assessment, economic

7.

See generally NATIONAL ACADEMY OF ScIENcEs, TECHNOLOGY: PROcESSEs OF ASSESSMENT
(1970); Katz, The Function of Tort Liability in Technology Assessment, 38

AND CHOICE
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analysis,8 and the type of remedy requested by the plaintiff, whether eminent
domain," inverse condemnation, 0 or injunctive relief,1 should influence the
decision. Appropriate political authorities should recognize the social nature of
the costs imposed and then take calculated action to redistribute these expenses in a manner which is both beneficial to the community and consistent
with constitutional requirements.
The key consideration is that more appropriate means of allocating some
environmental costs may exist. First, such an allocation seems to be constitutionally mandated. Second, if expenses must be incurred by the citizenry, a
strong argument can be made for choosing a method of assessment that is
highly visible 2 over one that results in charges hidden from the community
as a whole. Expenses paid through concealed channels and borne by a disproportionately small number of citizens seldom undergo the careful weighing
found in cost-benefit analyses.13 As a result, social costs may escalate unequally
for years before being discovered and investigated by the proper governmental
authority. Finally, although the environment must be protected, development
need not be brought to an untimely halt.1 4 The rapid growth of the last two
decades has admittedly caused much harm to Florida's environment, but the
pendulum must not be allowed to swing too far in the opposite direction. If

L. REv. 587 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Katz]; Tribe, Technology Assessment as
a Unifying Concept: Legal Frameworks for the Assessment and Control of Technology, 9
MINERVA 243 (1971).
8. See note 13 infra.
9. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. chs. 73-74 (1971).
10. See, e.g., State Road Dep't v. Tharp, 146 Fa. 745, 1 So. 2d 868 (1941); City of Jacksonville v. Schumann, 167 So. 2d 95 (1st D.C.A. Fla. 1964), cert. denied, 172 So. 2d 597 (Fa.
1965), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 981 (1968); Trippe v. Port of New York Authority, 17 App. Div.
2d 472, 236 N.Y.S.2d 312 (2d Dep't 1962). In Schumann the court explained that inverse
condemnation is the "popular description of a cause of action against a governmental defendant to recover the value of property which has been taken in fact by the governmental
defendant, even though no formal exercise of the power of eminent domain has been attempted by the taking agency." 167 So. 2d at 98.
11. See, e.g., Zabel v. Pinellas County Water & Navigation Control Authority, 171 So. 2d
376 (Fia. 1965); Forde v. City of Miami Beach, 146 Fla. 676, 1 So. 2d 642 (1941); Taylor v.
City of Jacksonville, 101 Na. 1241, 133 So. 114 (1931); ef. Ocean Villa Apartments, Inc. v.
City of Ft. Lauderdale, 70 So. 2d 901 (Fla. 1954). See generally Beuscher, Some Tentative
Notes on the Integration of Police Power and Emient Domain by the Courts: So-called Inverse or Reverse Condemnation, 1968 UaAN LAw ANN. 1, 6-8; Sackman, Impact of Zoning
and Eminent Domain on Each Other, 1971 INsTrrurm oN PLANNING, ZONING & EMINENT DoMAIN 107 (Southwestern Legal Foundation 1971).
12. See generally Surrey, Tax Incentives as a Device for Implementing Government Policy: A Comparison with Direct Government Expenditures, 83 HARv. L. REV. 705 (1970).
13. See generally R. McKEAN, TiE NATURE OF Cosr-BENEFrr ANALYsIS IN PUBaIC SPENDING
339 (1968).
14. See A Wall Around the Sunshine State, BusiNEss WEEK, July 3, 1971, at 4647, quoting
Albert Jaeggin: "If the State stops pushing for industrial growth, it will definitely slow development, because industry won't go where it isn't wanted. And then who's going to pay
for all the services that are needed? ... It's wonderful to be for ecology, but I hope someone's left to pay the taxes to produce the salaries 9f the politicians who espouse such a
CINCINNATI

course."
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Florida is to protect its environment while continuing favorable, yet controlled, economic growth, a deliberate compromise between these two policies
is necessary.
By demonstrating that some regulatory schemes may effect an unconstitutional taking of private property, this article attempts to stimulate the economic and political analysis required for such a compromise. The discussion
of issues is presented in a specific regulatory fact setting to provide both an
example for discussion and a model for extension of the conclusions reached
in similar areas.
The article focuses upon a factor common to each form of "compensating"
the landowner- whether a taking of property in the constitutional sense has
occurred. Following a brief consideration of the constitutional relevance of
whether property is "taken" or merely "damaged" by government action, the
broad question of when a taking of property occurs in the constitutional sense
is explored. A discussion of three theories frequently applied by the courts in
determining the taking issue is then succeeded by an elaboration and extension
of the theories developed by Professors Dunham, Sax, and Michelman. In addition, the problem of whether abandonment or withholding of government
services can effectuate a taking of property is discussed. Finally, an overview
is presented of several possible methods of apportioning financial and administrative responsibility for a taking caused by the actions of two or more government entities.
A

THRESHOLD QUESTION:

Is

THE PROPERTY "TAKEN"

OR MERELY "DAMAGED"?

The threshold question in any action for inverse condemnation or related
injunctive relief is whether the constitutional provision that provides the basis
for the property owner's claim requires compensation if the property is merely
"damaged" or only if it is actually "taken." The fifth amendment to the
United States Constitution's applies only to private property "taken for public
use, without just compensation."16 Although the constitutions of approximately one-half of the states require compensation for private property "taken
or damaged" by governmental actionY1 the Florida constitution' s follows the

15, The fifth amendment applies to the states through the fourteenth amendment. See
OF ENIINENT DOMAIN §§1.3, 4, 4.1 (3d rev. ed. 1970) [hereinafter
cited as P. NIcHOrs].
16. See United States v. Willow River Power Co., 324 U.S. 499, 510 (1945); United States
v. Dickinson, 331 U.S. 745 (1947), cited in Batten v. United States, 306 F.2d 580, 583-84 (10th
Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 955 (1963); Richards v. Washington Terminal Co., 233 U.S.
546, 554 (1914); City of Chicago v. Taylor, 125 U.S. 161 (1881); Transportation Co. v.
Chicago, 99 U.S. 635 (1878).
17. 2 P. NicHoLs, supra note 15, §6.1(3); Van Alstyne, Taking or Damaging by Police
Power: The Search for Inverse Condemnation Criteria, 44 So. CALIF. L. REv. 1 n.7 (1970).
For a listing of the states with particular constitutional language, see 2 P. NIcHoLs §6.1(3)
nn.28-29.
18. FLA. CONsY. art. X, §6(a) (1968), formerly FLA. CONST. Decl. of Rights §12; FLA.
CONST. art. XVI, §29 (1885).

I P. Nicsois, THE LAW
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federal pattern. Therefore, regardless of the economic loss involved, governmental action merely damaging the subject property will not support a
Floridas or federal 2O action for inverse condemnation. The restriction on land
use must be so onerous as to effectuate a taking before the constitutional right
21
to compensation attaches.
GOVERNMENTAL ACTION THAT EFFECTS A TAKING OF PROPERTY:
USEFUL THEORIES

Although agreement is readily reached that compensation is required only
for a governmental taking of property and not for losses occasioned by mere
regulation,2 2 the difficult task is formulating an analytical framework which
is useful in deciding any given case. In some instances it will be dear that
compensation is 2 3 or is not 24 required. In general, however, inverse condemnation law is a welter of confusing and apparently incompatible decisions. 25 The
lack of a concise test raises particular difficulties when the courts must consider the application of inverse condemnation concepts to new areas such as
airport noise2 6 and environmental regulations. The numerous modes of analysis possible and the seeming inconsistency of principal decisions require judicial analysis of inverse condemnation cases on several levels, taking into account major theories suggested by commentators and existing precedent. This
section is designed to delineate and explain these theories as they apply both
to takings in general and to takings effected by regulations designed to protect
27
the environment.
19. E.g., Board of Pub. Instruction v. Town of Bay Harbor Islands, 81 So. 2d 637, 642
(Fla. 1955); Arundel Corp. v. Griffin, 89 Fla. 128, 103 So. 422, 424 (1925). See 3 J. AnKiNs,
FLORIDA REAL EsrATE LAW AND PROCEDURE §83.06 (1960). Compare Bowden v. City of Jacksonville, 52 Fla. 216, 42 So. 394 (1906) (compensation denied for change in road elevation),
with Kendry v. State Road Dep't, 213 So. 2d 23, 26 (4th D.C.A. Fla. 1968), cert. denied, 222
So. 2d 752 (Fla. 1969). See also Paulsen, The Persistence of Substantive Due Process in the
States, 34 MINN. L. Rv. 91 (1950).
20. E.g., United States v. Willow River Power Co., 324 U.S. 499, 510 (1945); Transportation Co. v. Chicago, 99 U.S. 635, 642 (1878); cf. Chicago, B. & Q.R.R. v. Chicago, 166 U.S.
226 (1897).
21. A distinction must be made, however, between action that merely damages all or
part of a parcel of land and that which actually effects a taking of but a small portion of a
larger piece of property. The former would only require compensation in states having the
more liberal constitutional provision. But even under the Florida and United States Constitutions, the latter action would require remuneration.
22. Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36, 37 (1964).
23. E.g., Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co., 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 166 (1871).
24. E.g., Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887).
25. The uncertainty of any underlying doctrine has effectively been acknowledged by the
United States Supreme Court itself, which far too frequently introduces its opinions in the
area with the understatement (Sax, supra note 22, at 37) that no rigid rules (United States
v. Caltex, Inc., 344 U.S. 149, 156 (1952), or set formulas (Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead,
369 US. 590, 594 (1962), are available to determine where regulation ends and taking begins.
26. See notes 67, 76 infra.
27. For another study, see Binder, Taking Versus Reasonable Regulation: A Reappraisal
in Light of Regional Planningand Wetlands, 25 U. FLA. L. Rxv. 1 (1972).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1973

5

Florida Law Review, Vol. 25, Iss. 4 [1973], Art. 1

UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XXV

Evolution of the Physical Invasion - Mere Regulation Distinction:
Denial of All Reasonable Use
One of the oldest theories in the inverse condemnation field provides that
a compensable taking occurs only when governmental action results in physical
encroachment upon, or actual use or occupation of, a privately-owned asset
of economic value. -"5 Under this approach, "mere regulation" of the manner
in which economic assets are used is not a compensable taking.
Although the physical invasion standard is helpful in requiring compensation when an actual appropriation of property occurs, 29 it fails to explain
those situations where compensation for physical destruction is denied. s °
Moreover, the test does not recognize that regulation may become so substantial or severe that the owner is precluded from making any reasonable use
of his property.31 Conceptually, the standard assumes that the objectives gained
by actual appropriation cannot be achieved by regulation.32 As the courts have
pointed out, however, appropriation and regulation may be merely alternative

Two caveats concerning the development of compensation theories should be noted at the
outset. First, reliance upon tort law concepts to determine when a taking of property occurs
is inadvisable. Tort concepts are useful in this context only in developing broad remedial
policies to ensure that an injured party receives compensation from some source. Van Alstyne,
Modernizing Inverse Condemnation: A Legislative Prospectus, 8 SANTA CLARA LAW. 1, 13
(1967). Second, suggestions that compensation is required in eminent domain actions, but not
for governmental exercises of the police power, are of little assistance. Although this distinction is frequently asserted, efforts to dichotomize the essential characteristics of these two
government powers "have produced much in the way of dilemma and disagreement and little,
if anything, that can be described as basic consensus." Id. See, e.g., Consolidated Rock Products Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 57 Cal. 2d 515, 370 P.2d 342, 351, 20 Cal. Rptr. 368, appeal
dismissed, 371 U.S. 36 (1962), noted in 50 CALIF. L. Rav. 896 (1962); In re Angelus, 65 Cal.
App. 2d 441, 454-55, 150 P.2d 908, 914-15 (1944); West Bros. Brick Co. v. City of Alexandria,
169 Va. 271, 290, 192 S.E. 881, 889 (1937); Comment, Distinguishing Eminent Domain from
Police Power and Tort, 38 WASH. L. REv. 607 (1963). See also Taylor v. City of Jacksonville,
101 Fla. 1241, 133 So. 114, 116 (1931).
28. Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887); Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co., 80 U.S. (13 Wall.)
166 (1871). Cf. Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915); L'Hote v. New Orleans, 177 U.S.
587 (1900).
29. E.g., Griggs v. Allegheny County, 369 U.S. 84 (1962); United States v. Causby, 328
U.S. 256 (1949); United States v. Cress, 243 U.S. 316 (1917); United States v. Lynah, 188 U.S.
445 (1903); Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co., 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 166 (1871).
30. E.g., Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272 (1928) (destruction of cedar trees to protect
apple orchards from cedar rust); Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133 (1894) (destruction of fishnets, which could not lawfully be used).
31. E.g., Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922); Ocean Villa Apartments,
Inc. v. City of Ft. Lauderdale, 70 So. 2d 901 (Fla. 1954); Taylor v. City of Jacksonville, 101
Fla. 1241, 133 So. 114 (1931); Helseth v. DuBose, 99 Fla. 812, 128 So. 4 (1930); City of Jacksonville v. Schumann, 167 So. 2d 95 (Ist D.C.A. Fla. 1964), cert. denied, 172 So. 2d 597 (Fla.
1965), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 981 (1968); Thornburg v. Port of Portland, 233 Ore. 178, 376
P.2d 100 (1962); Martin v. Port of Seattle, 64 Wash. 2d 309, 391 P.2d 540 (1964), cert denied,
379 U.S. 989 (1965). Cf. Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40 (1960).
32. Alternatively, the theory assumes that even though the same goal is reached in each
instance, only the means to that goal is crucial. See Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260
U.S. 393, 418 (1922) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
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techniques for achieving the same goal. 33 Conditioning compensability on a
finding of physical invasion elevates form over substance and risks inequality
of treatment for essentially similar claims.
Initially, the physical invasion test played a crucial role3 4 in the development of American compensation theory.35 Although now the physical en-

33. See City of Miami v. Romer, 73 So. 2d 285 (Fla. 1954) (set-back line ordinance
implemented to reduce possible price city would have to pay if property ultimately taken
for street purposes, gives cause of action to owner of property); Hager v. Louisville & Jefferson County Planning & Zoning Comm'n, 261 S.W.2d 619 (Ky. 1953) (compensation cannot be
avoided by zoning private land as a ponding area for water storage as part of a flood control
plan); Morris County Land Improvement Co. v. Township of Parsippany-Troy Hills, 40 N.J.
539, 193 A.2d 232 (1963) (compensation cannot be avoided by zoning private property exclusively for useful township sewage treatment, water supply facilities, and 'public recreation); City of Plainfield v. Borough of Middlesex, 69 NJ. Super. 136, 173 A.2d 785 (Law Ct.,
Div. 1961) (compensation cannot be avoided by zoning private property exclusively for school,
park, and playground use).
34. Compare Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887) (compensation denied), with Pumpelly
v. Green Bay Co., 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 166 (1871) (compensation required).
35. Space limitations do not permit a full discussion of the historical evolution and
demise of the physical invasion concept in these pages. An overview of the history, however, is sketched below to assist in the understanding of the position which the physical
invasion standard has in contemporary compensation law. For a more detailed explanation,
see Sax, supra note 22, at 38-46.
The physical invasion concept gained importance during the period of the first Mr. Justice
Harlan. Because most of the early authority in the taking field evolved after the adoption of
the fourteenth amendment, it was the first Justice Harlan who served as the principal
architect of American compensation theory. Id. at 38. As the landmark case of Mugler v.
Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887), indicates, Justice Harlan was a strong proponent of the physical
invasion requirement. Noting that the regulation did not actually appropriate private property for public benefit, id. at 668, Justice Harlan carefully distinguished Pumpelly v. Green
Bay Co., 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 166 (1871), on the ground that, unlike Mugler, it involved a
"permanent flooding of private property . .. [a] physical invasion of the real estate of the
private owner, and a practical ouster of his possession." 123 U.S. at 668. Justice Harlan also
distinguished between noxious and innocent uses of property. Id. at 657, 668-69. See Fertilizer
Co. v. Hyde Park, 97 U.S. 659 (1878) (operation of a fertilizer plant in the middle of a city
is a noxious use that the government can abate without payment of compensation, no
matter how great the private economic loss involved). Essentially, Justice Harlan was separating takings from police power regulations by using mechanical definitions of the terms
"property" and "taking." Because no one can obtain a vested right to injure the public, the
abatement of a noxious use could not be a taking of "property" requiring compensation.
Sax, supra note 22, at 39. Gardner v. Michigan, 199 US. 325 (1905), cited by Professor Sax
as authority for this proposition, is not wholly in point with the present problem of environmental degradation, because the "property," garbage from a hotel, was itself noxious.
The hotel producing the garbage, however, was presumably still "property" in the constitutional sense. 199 U.S. at 330-31.
During a period marked by increasing governmental regulation of private economic action,
the first Justice Harlan left the Court and Mr. Justice Holmes rose to accept leadership in
the continuing development of compensation theory. Sax, supra note 22, at 40. The social
conflict of this period exerted a strong influence upon Holmes' approach to the separation
of compensable takings and valid exercises of the police power. Established interests were
engaged in conflict with the forces of social change. On both the state and federal levels,
vast fields of hitherto free enterprise were brought under governmental supervision. F. FRANKFURTrIR, MR. JusricE HoLMEs AND THE SUPREME CouRT 50 (2d ed. 1961). To Holmes, the
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croachment requirement is seldom invoked, 36 it does reappear on occasion,37
frustrating otherwise acceptable claims for relief. Because current application
of this requirement would effectively block any claim for compensation based
upon the adverse impact of environmental regulations, the present status of
the physical invasion standard must be briefly reviewed.
The classic example of rejection of the physical invasion standard appears
in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon.3 8 In that case, the United States Supreme
Court found that a statutory taking of the coal company's property rights had
occurred and held the company to be entitled to compensation under the fifth
and fourteenth amendments to the Constitution. Speaking for the Court,
Justice Holmes reasoned that "while property may be regulated to a certain
extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking." 39 Holmes
admitted that "[g]overnment hardly could go on if to some extent values incident to property could not be diminished without paying for every such

limited role of the judiciary in this conflict was to ensure that the contest for power was
carried out in an arena of fairness and equality. "Fairness" required restraints by all parties.
In the compensation field, the private property owner would have to concede "that the
constitutional requirement of compensation when property is taken cannot be pressed to its
grammatical extreme; that property rights may be taken for public purposes if [the government does] not take too much; that some play must be allowed . . . if the machine is to
work." Tyson & Bros. v. Banton, 273 U.S. 418, 445-46 (1927). At the same time, the promoters
of social change would have to recognize that "a strong public desire to improve the public
condition is not enough to warrant achieving the desire by a shorter cut than the constitutional way of paying for the change." Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 416
(1922). In a lengthy per curiam opinion citing Mahon, the Florida supreme court has made
a more emotional commitment to a similar conclusion. L. Maxcy, Inc. v. Mayo, 103 Fla. 552,
570, 139 So. 121, 129 (1932).
Unlike the first Justice Harlan, Mr. Justice Holmes attached no qualitative difference
between physical takings and mere regulatory exercises of the police power. To Holmes, each
case was part of a continuum "in which established property interests were asked to yield
more or less to the pressures of public demands." Sax, supra note 22, at 41. Holmes' constitutional focus was on the degree of economic harm inflicted by the governmental action. In
Interstate Consol. St. Ry. v. Massachusetts, 207 U.S. 79, 87 (1907), he noted that "the question narrows itself to the magnitude of the burden imposed." Although a governmental
action might not require compensation if it involved only a "comparatively insignificant
taking," Noble State Bank v. Haskell, 219 U.S. 104, 110 (1911), or "the infliction of some
fractional and relatively small losses," Interstate Consol. St. Ry. v. Massachusetts, supra, if
the affected property were made "wholly useless, the rights of property would prevail over
the other public interest, and the police power would fail." Hudson County Water Co. v.
McCarter, 209 U.S. 349, 355 (1908).
36. Sax, supra note 22, at 46. See 2 P. NicHoLs, supra note 15, §6.3.
37. E.g., Batten v. United States, 306 F.2d 580 (10th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 371 US. 955
(1963); Harris v. United States, 205 F.2d 765, 767 (10th Cir. 1953). See United States v. Central
Eureka Mining Co., 357 U.S. 155 (1958).
38. 260 U.S. 393 (1922). Mr. Justice Brandeis filed the single dissenting opinion. Id. at
416, 417: A "restriction imposed to protect the public health, safety or morals from dangers
threatened is not a taking. The restriction here in question is merely the prohibition of a
noxious use. The property so restricted remains in the possession of its owner." For a discussion of this case, see Binder, supra note 27.
39. 260 U.S. at 415.
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change." 40 But he warned that when the implied limitation on private property rights "reaches a certain magnitude, in most if not in all cases there must
41
be an exercise of eminent domain and compensation to sustain the act."
The difficult question under Holmes' analysis is to determine when the
regulatory action is so severe that a compensable taking must be found. Although Mahon considers the issue to be "a matter of degree" and therefore
one which "cannot be disposed of by general propositions," 42 the test applied
seems to turn on whether the regulation so substantially impairs the property
that it cannot be put to any reasonable use: "What makes the right to mine
coal valuable is that it can be exercised with profit. To make it commercially
impracticable to mine certain coal has very nearly the same effect for constitu4
tional purposes as appropriating or destroying it." 3
Although Justice Holmes' approach in Mahon provides much of the heritage for contemporary compensation theory, the Court's present stance on the
taking question is far from clear. Three well-known decisions exemplify the
modem approach.
In Armstrong v. United States,44 the Government had made certain materialmen's liens unenforceable by asserting sovereign immunity.45 The Court
of Claims effectively rejected petitioners' claim that the Government's interposition of the immunity doctrine was a compensable taking of property. 46
On appeal, the Supreme Court held that the Government's action constituted
a taking of property without just compensation.47 Speaking for the Court
Justice Black reasoned:4

40.
41.

Id. at 413.
Id.

42. Id. at 416. Justice Holmes noted that "the greatest weight" is given to the legislature
in cases "of this nature." Id. at 413.
43. Id. at 414. Initially, the Mahon opinion seems to use a "balancing" process to determine when a regulation exceeds the bounds of the police power. Id. at 413-14. This aspect
of the opinion, however, does not seem to be controlling. See notes 138-139 infra. Justice
Holmes expressly distinguished a line of decisions denying compensation under laws intended to meet a temporary emergency and providing for compensation determined to be
reasonable by an impartial board. E.g., Marcus Brown Holding Co., Inc. v. Feldman, 256 U.S.
170 (1921); Block v. Hirsh, 256 U.S. 135 (1921). Even in Mahon the Court assumed that the
statute was passed "upon the conviction that an exigency existed that would warrant it" and
that would warrant the exercise of eminent domain. 260 U.S. at 416.
44. 364 U.S. 40 (1960). See City of El Paso v. Simmons, 379 U.S. 497, 533-34 (1965)' (Black,
J., dissenting).
45. The United States had contracted for the building of ships under an agreement providing that, in the event of default by the company, title to all completed and uncompleted
work would be transferred to the United States. Default occurred and several hulls passed
to the Government. Because the shipbuilder had not paid for all of his materials, petitionersmaterialmen sought to enforce their state materialmen's liens against the United States. ME.
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, §3842 (1964).
46. Armstrong v. United States, 169 F. Supp. 259 (Ct. Cl. 1959), reu'd, 364 U.S. 40 (1960).
47. 364 US. at 48.
48. Id.
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Before the liens were destroyed, the lienholders admittedly had compensable property. Immediately afterwards, they had none. This was
not because their property vanished into thin air. It was because the
Government for its own advantage destroyed the value of the liens,
something the the Government could do because its property was not
subject to suit, but which no private purchaser could have done.
Justice Black also noted that compensation was required regardless of the
49
intent or the means used by the Government to accomplish the act.

Armstrong may turn on either a Holmesian finding that the Government's
assertion of sovereign immunity made the liens useless for any reasonable purpose or a determination that the Government wholly appropriated the property for its own advantage in a proprietary capacity. The latter approach
would be closely related to the physical invasion concept employed by the
first Mr. Justice Harlan.50 In either event, the ambiguity of Armstrong provides little guidance for future decisions.
Two years after Armstrong the Court continued to shroud its compensation standard in Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead.51 Citing the first Justice
Harlan's opinion in Mugler v. Kansas,52 the Court announced that if an
ordinance is an otherwise valid exercise of the police power, "the fact that it
deprives the property of its most beneficial use does not render it unconstitutional."5 3 Nevertheless, the Court preserved the Mahon heritage by stating:

49. The phrase in the opinion states: "however acccomplished, whether with an intent
Id.
and purpose of extinguishing the liens or not ....
50. For other recent cases that may employ the physical invasion standard, see Griggs v.
Allegheny County, 369 U.S. 84 (1962); United States v. Central Eureka Mining Co., 357 U.S.
155, 165-66 (1958); United States v. Kansas City Life Ins. Co., 339 U.S. 799 (1950); United
States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 266 (1946) ("it is the character of the invasion, not the amount
of damage resulting from it ... that determines the question of whether it is a taking").
The three dissenting Justices in Armstrong urged that no taking had occurred because
the economic damage inflicted was a mere "consequential incidence" of a valid exercise of
the power of sovereign immunity. 364 U.S. at 49 (Harlan, J., joined by Frankfurter and
Douglas, JJ., dissenting). The majority simply rejected this suggestion without explanation.
364 U.S. at 48. Although the "consequential incidence" theory is not defined in Armstrong,
other decisions suggest that it is used in two ways. First, it is a synonym for the physical invasion concept. United States v. Dickinson, 331 U.S. 745, 750 (1947); Gibson v. United States,
166 U.S. 269, 274-75 (1897). Some indication of this use appears in the Armstrong dissent:
"We are not here dealing with a situation in which the United States has condemned a full
fee interest in property, thus purporting to extinguish all claims therein." 364 U.S. at 50. If
the Armstrong minority was using the phrase in the physical invasion context, then the
majority opinion may be a rejection of that standard. Second, the term is apparently used
to show that the harm imposed is justified because the governmental act is independently
privileged. The injury must be borne as to the incidental consequence of a legally privileged
act. Sax, supra note 22, at 46 n.60. In the Armstrong dissent the sovereign immunity doctrine
provided the privilege: "The very nature of the doctrine of sovereign immunity precludes
regarding its interposition as a Fifth Amendment 'taking.'" 364 U.S. at 50.
51. 369 U.S. 590 (1962). For an explanation of the facts of this case and a somewhat
differing view as to the result reached, see Binder, supra note 27, at 4.
52. 123 U.S. 623 (1887).
53. 369 U.S. at 592 (emphasis added). In addition to Mugler, the Court cited the following cases for this proposition: Walls v. Midland Carbon Co., 254 U.S. 300 (1920); Hada-
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"This is not to say, however, that governmental action in the form of regulation cannot be so onerous as to constitute a taking which constitutionally requires compensation."" Goldblatt thus preserves the possibility that a regulation that prevents an owner from making any reasonable economic use of his
property would require compensation. 55
Several months later, the Court refused a dear opportunity to clarify the
question left open in Goldblatt.The appellant in ConsolidatedRock Products

Co. v. Los Angeles56 posed the issue as "whether zoning ordinances which
altogetherdestroy the worth of valuable land by prohibiting the only economic
57
use of which it is capable effects a taking of property without compensation."
The case arose when the City of Los Angeles zoned appellant's property for
agricultural and residential use, thereby prohibiting the removal of rock,
gravel, and sand from the land.58 The trial court found that the property had
no "economic value" after the ordinance was enacted, 59 noting that without
an expenditure of "prohibitive amounts of money" to build a flood control
channel, the property could only serve as a detritus spreading ground for a
nearby dam 0 or as a park or wildlife area.6 ' Conceding that "in relation to its
value for the extraction of rock, sand, and gravel the value of the property for
any of the described uses is small if not minimal" and that "as to a considerable part of it, seasonal flooding might prevent its continuous use for any purpose,"6 2 the California supreme court apparently accepted evidence presented
to "the legislative body," which enacted the ordinance, that the property could
check v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915); Reinmen v. Little Rock, 237 U.S. 171 (1915). See
Laurel Hill Cemetery v. San Francisco, 216 U.S. 358 (1910).
54. 369 U.S. at 594. The Court warned: "There is no set formula to determine where
regulation ends and taking begins." Id.
55. Although the Court conceded that the ordinance involved completely prohibited a
beneficial use to which the property had previously been devoted, it cautioned that "such a
characterization does not tell us whether or not the ordinance is constitutional." 369 U.S. at
592. See notes 72-91 and accompanying text infra.
56. 57 Cal. 2d 515, 370 P.2d 342, 20 Cal. Rptr. 638, appeal dismissed, 371 U.S. 36 (1962),
noted in 50 CALIF. L. REv. 896 (1962).
57. Brief for Appellant, Jurisdictional Statement at 5 (emphasis added).
58. Although limited excavation operations were being conducted on adjacent properties,
appellant's land was not being mined when the ordinance was passed. Appellant, Consolidated
Rock Products Co., leased the property from appellant, Valley Real Estate Corp., 57 Cal. 2d
at 518, 370 P.2d at 344, 20 Cal. Rptr. at 640.
59. Interestingly, the court refused to find that the land had no "value." The finding
was made by the court's stating that 114 of the complaint was true, "adding thereto, on page
5, line 32, the word 'economic' before the word 'value."' Brief for Appellant, Jurisdictional
Statement, app. C at 39a. The trial court stated that any suggestion that the property would
have economic value for any use other than rock, gravel, and sand excavation would be
"preposterous." 40 Cal. 2d at 519, 370 P.2d at 344, 20 Cal. Rptr. at 640. A full statement of
the trial court's comments appears in the opinion of the California Second District Court of
Appeal, Consolidated Rock Prods. Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 15 Cal. Rptr. 775, 777 n.2, 778
n.3 (Dist. Ct. App. Cal. 1961).
60. 15 Cal. Rptr. at 778 n.2.
61. Brief for Appellant in Opposition to Appellee's Motion To Dismiss at 3, Consolidated
Rock Prods. Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 371 US. 36 (1962).
62. 57 Cal. 2d at 530, 370 P.2d at 351, 20 Cal. Rptr. at 647 (emphasis added).
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be utilized successfully for several other purposes. 63 The court, therefore, held
64
that no right of compensation existed.
In a per curiam decision, the United States Supreme Court dismissed the
appeal for lack of a substantial federal question. 65 The dismissal was technically on the merits and therefore good precedent. 66 As such, the case may involve a clouded application of the rule announced in Goldblatt. Rather than
concluding that compensation is not required when a zoning ordinance prevents any reasonable use of the affected property, the Court may have simply
accepted the finding of the California supreme court that the property could
be used for other valuable purposes. If this conclusion is correct, Consolidated
Rock Products, like Goldblatt, leaves open the possibility that compensation
would be required if a regulation prevents property from being put to any
economically feasible use. The former decision, however, does suggest that any
claim of "no reasonable use" must be strong and convincing.
The current status of compensation law is outlined with more clarity, if
perhaps less authority, in the state decisions. Notwithstanding some lower

63. E.g., for stabling horses, cattle feeding and grazing, chicken raising, dog kennels,
fish hatcheries, golf courses, certain types of horticulture and recreation. 57 Cal. 2d at 530,
370 P.2d at 351, 20 Cal. Rptr. at 647. Appellants strongly contested this suggestion, noting
that no such evidence was presented to the city planning commission or the city council.
Appellants urged that the court's statement was improperly based upon testimony of the
City Planning Commissioner at the trial that the enumerated uses were merely permissible
(not necessarily possible). Other testimony at the trial did suggest that the land could be
successfully devoted to chicken raising, horse stabling, or cattle feeding. Brief for Appellants,
Jurisdictional Statement at 18 n.5.
64. 57 Cal. 2d 515, 370 P.2d 342, 20 Cal. Rptr. 368 (1962).
65. 371 U.S. 36 (1962) (Justices Harlan and Douglas thought that probable jurisdiction
should have been noted).
66. H. HART & H. WECHSLER, FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTET 574 (1953); Note,
Supreme Court Per Curiam Practice: A Critique, 69 HARV. L. REV. 707, 712 (1956); Note,
The Insubstantial Federal Question, 62 Harv. L. Rev. 488, 494 (1949). The significance of
such dismissals has been the subject of considerable professional discussion. E.g., Hart, The
Business of the Supreme Court at the October Terms, 1937 and 1938, 53 HARV. L. REY. 579
(1940); Moore & Vestal, Present and Potential Role of Certification in Federal Appellate
Procedure, 35 VA. L. REv. 1, 45 (1949); Comment, Per Curiam Decisions of the Supreme
Court: 1957 Terms, 26 U. Cm. L. REv. 279 (1958).
Use of the Consolidated Rock Products dismissal as precedent should be approached
with caution due to the possibility that the Court's action reflects an "improperly presented"
federal question. Naim v. Naim, 350 U.S. 985 (1956). See generally Zucht v. King, 260 U.S.
174 (1922); Dahnke-Walker Milling Co. v. Bondurant, 257 U.S. 282 (1921). Professor Sax,
however, laments: "The constitutional question was clearly presented and squarely decided
below; the record was free of those ambiguities and uncertainties which frequently seem to
induce a denial of review; and the appeal was competently presented by one of the country's
leading law firms." Sax, supra note 22, at 44. Similar caution may be appropriate due to an
unapparent lack of finality below. See Note, Supreme Court Per Curiam Practice, supra at
711. Moreover, the Court may have utilized the dismissal for the questionable purpose of
exercising discretion in its jurisdiction over appeals. See Wiener, The Supreme Court's New
Rules, 68 HARV. L. REv. 20, 54 (1954) (quoting Chief Justice Warren). See generally D. CtuRIE, FEDERAL COURTS 217-23 (1968).
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federal court precedent to the contrary, 67 most state courts68 today have accepted the proposition that whether the government takes title to or possession

of the subject property69 is merely "a matter of the form in which it chooses to
proceed." 70 Several state courts have answered the question left open by Gold-

67. E.g., Batten v. United States, 806 F.2d 580 (10th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 955
(1963); Harris v. United States, 205 F.2d 765, 767 (10th Cir. 1953). Both decisions refused
compensation in airport noise settings because the planes involved did not fly over the subject properties.
68. Sax, supra note 22, at 46. For a summary by jurisdictions, see 2 P. NihoLs, supra
note 15, §6.3: "The modem and prevailing view is that any substantial interference with
private property which destroys or lessens its value ... is, in fact and in law, a 'taking' in
the constitutional sense, to the extent of the damages suffered, even though the title and
possession of the owner remain undisturbed." The courts in Michigan, Pennsylvania, and
South Carolina have construed constitutional provisions similar to that in the Florida constitution to mean that a physical invasion is not required. City of Big Rapids v. Big Rapids
Furniture Mfg. Co., 210 Mich. 158, 177 N.W. 284 (1920) (blocking a driveway by changing
a road grade), followed in Thom v. State, 376 Mich. 608, 188 N.W.2d 322 (1965); In re
Sansom St., 293 Pa. 186, 143 A. 134 (1928) (setback ordinance restricting future building),
followed in Cleaver v. Tredyffrin Township, 414 Pa. 367, 200 A.2d 408 (1964); Gasque v.
Town of Conway, 194 S.C. 15, 8 S.E.2d 871 (1940) (refusal of a permit for operation of a gas

station).
Although the South Carolina constitution speaks in terms of takings, judicial decisions in
that state must be analyzed with care. The South Carolina courts have consistently adhered
to the rather interesting doctrine that "within the purview of this constitutional provision,
there is no distinction between taking and damaging .... [T]he least damage to property
constitutes a taking within the purview of the [South Carolina] Constitution." State Highway
Dep't v. Wilson, 254 S.C. 360, 175 S.E.2d 391, 395 (1970).
One questionable line of authority suggests a somewhat contrary position. These decisions
urge that cases requiring compensation under the police power were greatly weakened by
the Supreme Court's approval of comprehensive zoning legislation in Euclid v. Ambler
Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926). For statements of this position, see Consolidated Rock Prods.
Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 57 Cal. 2d 515, 370 P.2d 342, 349-51, 20 Cal. Rptr. 638, appeal
dismissed, 371 U.S. 36 (1962); Town of Burlington v. Dunn, 318 Mass. 216, 21 N.E.2d 243,
246, cert. denied, 326 U.S. 739 (1945); West Bros. Brick Co. v. City of Alexandria, 169 Va.
271, 192 S.E. 881, 889 (1937); In re Angelus, 65 Cal. App. 2d 441, 150 P.2d 908, 914-15 (1944).
Even though Euclid was decided after Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, later cases in the
state and federal courts suggest that the principles espoused in Mahon survived Euclid with
little adverse effect.
69. Modem sophisticated notions of "property" have helped weaken the physical invasion approach applied by the first Justice Harlan. Van Alstyne, supra note 17, at 2 n.5. For
discussions of contemporary property concepts, see Michelman, Property, Utility ad Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of "Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARV. L. RV.
1165, 1202-13 (1967); Philbrick, Changing Conceptions of Property in Law, 86 U. PA. L. Rzv.
691 (1938); Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964). Cf. Kass v. Kewin, 104 So.
2d 572, 578 (Fla. 1958).
70. Sax, supra note 22, at 46. See Michelman, supra note 69, at 1186; Van Alstyne, supra
note 27, at 14-15. "Wordplay-in short dogged adherence to the constitutional formulas of
'taking' and 'property'- cannot justify any sharp line of distinction between governmental
encroachments which take the different forms of affirmative occupancy and negative restraint." Michelman, supra note 69, at 1186-87. Professor Michelman cautions that the fact
that governmental action can be viewed as a "taking" does not necessarily require money
compensation, at least under a "fairness" view of compensation theory. Id. at 1186 n.44. For
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blatt and Consolidated Rock Products by holding that a taking of private
property occurs when a governmental regulation so restricts the use of the
property that the land cannot practically be utilized for any reasonable purpose. 71
Although not expressly repudiating the physical invasion test, Florida decisions seem to be in accord with this judicial philosophy. Florida law appears
to require a physical invasion before relief or damages will be afforded to
owners of property adjoining properly condemned land.72 Further, absent ex-

press agreement, a municipal corporation need not compensate an abutting
property owner for any incidental losses suffered from the change of grade of

an explanation of a possible analytical difference between affirmative easements ("easements")
and negative easements ("servitudes"), see id. at 1187 n.45.
71. E.g., In re Kelso, 147 Cal. 609, 82 P. 241 (1905) (invalid ordinance absolutely prohibited maintenance or operation of a rock or stone quarry within a certain part of San
Francisco); Burritt v. Harris, 172 So. 2d 820, 822-23 (Fla. 1965); Forde v. City of Miami
Beach, 146 Fla. 676, 1 So. 2d 642 (1941); Morris County Land Improvement Co. v. ParsippanyTroy Hills, 40 N.J. 539, 193 A.2d 232 (1963); Arverne Bay Constr. Co. v. Thatcher, 278 N.Y.
222, 15 N.E.2d 587, 591-92 (1938) (the taking was couched in terms of a permanent restriction. The New York constitution allows compensation for damagings as well as takings). The
unanimous decision of the New Jersey supreme court in Morris County Land Improvement
Co. v. Parsippany-Troy Hills, 40 N.J. 539, 193 A.2d 232 (1963), provides a sound example of
this line of state authority. The zoning ordinance was enacted to maintain private land in
its natural state, essentially for such public purposes as floodwater detention basins and a
wetland wildlife sanctuary. The court distinguished Hager v. Louisville & Jefferson County
Planning & Zoning Comm'n, 261 S.W.2d 619 (Ct. App. Ky. 1953); Grosso v. Board of Adjustment, 137 N.J.L. 630, 61 A.2d 167 (1948); Miller v. City of Beaver Falls, 368 Pa. 189, 82
A.2d 34 (1951), as involving more direct interference with property uses, and held that
compensation was required, relying on Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922);
Yara Eng'r Corp. v. City of Newark, 132 NJ.L. 370, 40 A.2d 559 (1945) (height zoning ordinance designed to prevent interference with aircraft takeoffs and landings held an unconstitutional substitute for eminent domain and compensation of property owners); City of
Plainfield v. Borough of Middlesex, 69 NJ. Super. 136, 173 A.2d 785 (Law Ct., Div. 1961).
The court recognized that a compensable taking may occur through "excessive regulation
under the police power," which indirectly but substantially restricts the use to which the
subject property may be put. 40 NJ. at 554, 193 A.2d at 241. Compensation must be paid,
the court explained when the governmental regulation so restricts the land use that it "cannot practically be utilized for any reasonable purpose" or when "the only permitted uses
are those to which the property is not adapted or which are economically infeasible." Id. at
557, 193 A.2d at 242. This decision, the court noted, was made even though the zoning involved "laudable public purposes" motivated by "high mindedness" and although the owner
of most of the affected property supported the regulations. Id. at 555, 193 A.2d at 241. This
language suggests that the court either rejected the "balancing" test (discussed in the text
accompanying notes 130-156 infra) or struck a balance in favor of the landowner. If the
former conclusion is correct, the case should have an important impact on the Florida courts.
Several Florida zoning decisions use the test found in the Morris County case, but most if
not all of the opinions involved may have turned on an inadequate showing of public necessity for the zoning regulations. See text accompanying notes 141-152 infra.
72. E.g., Wier v. Palm Beach County, 85 So. 2d 865 (Fla. 1956); Selden v. City of Jacksonville, 28 Fla. 558, 10 So. 457 (1891); City of Tampa v. Texas Co., 107 So. 2d 216 (2d
D.C.A. Fla. 1958). See Comment, Eminent Domain: Inverse Condemnation - What Constitutes
a Taking?, 21 U. FtA. L. REV. 257, 259 (1968).
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a public street.7 3 However, these two classes of decisions may turn not on the
lack of a physical invasion, but on a finding that the affected property was
merely "damaged" rather than "taken."
More important in the context of this article are the Florida decisions
holding that zoning regulations which deprive an owner of any beneficial use,
of his land are unconstitutional takings of property.74 Of similar importance
are the cases suggesting that denial of a permit to fill submerged lands75 or
the continuing nuisance of airport noise76 may be takings of property without
just compensation. Whether these decisions would support a cause of action
requesting compensation or equitable relief from the onerous effect of environmental regulations has yet to be settled.
One of the Florida supreme court's strongest statements with regard to
zoning ordinances came in Ocean Villa Apartments, Inc. v. City of Ft. Lauderdale: 7
This court is committed to the doctrine that when the application of
a zoning ordinance has the effect of completely depriving the owner of
the beneficial use of his property by precluding the only use to which
it is reasonably adapted, an attack on the validity of the ordinance as
applied to the particular property involved will be sustained.
Although later cited as holding by the court,78 the Ocean Villa statement must
be used with caution. The decision in Ocean Villa merely involved a denial of
certiorari from the circuit court's refusal to grant summary judgment against
the city. The Florida court carefully reserved judgment on the issue of whether

78. Compare Bowden v. City of Jacksonville, 52 Fla. 216, 42 So. 394 (1906) (no express
agreement, compensation denied), with Kendry v. State Road Dep't, 213 So. 2d 23, 26 (4th
D.C.A. Fla. 1968) (road easements of title contained restriction on grade, compensation required), cert. denied, 222 So. 2d 752 (Fla. 1969).
74. E.g., Burritt v. Harris, 172 So. 2d 820, 822-23 (Fla. 1965); Ocean Villa Apartments,
Inc. v. City of Ft. Lauderdale, 70 So. 2d 901 (Fla. 1954); Forde v. City of Miami Beach, 146
Fla. 676, 1 So. 2d 642 (1941); State ex rel. Taylor v. City of Jacksonville, 101 Fla. 1241, 183
So. 114 (1931); State ex rel. Helseth v. DuBose, 99 Fla. 812, 128 So. 4 (1930); Metropolitan
Dade County v. Greenlee, 224 So. 2d 781 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1969); Manilow v. City of Miami
Beach, 213 So. 2d 589, 593 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1968), cert. discharged, 226 So. 2d 805 (Fla. 1969),
cert. denied, 397 U.S. 972 (1970); Kugel v. City of Miami Beach, 206 So. 2d 282, 284 (3d
D.C.A. Fla. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1021 (1969).
75. Zabel v. Pinellas County Water & Navigation Control Authority, 171 So. 2d 376 (Fla.
1965). See note 141 infra.
76. City of Jacksonville v. Schumann, 167 So. 2d 95 (1st D.C.A. Fla. 1964), cert. denied,
172 So. 2d 597 (Fla. 1965), rehearing denied, 199 So. 2d 727 (1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 981
(1968). See generally Hill, Liability for Aircraft Noise: The Aftermath of Causby and Griggs,

19 U. Mumi L. REv. 1 (1964).
77. 70 So. 2d 901, 902 (Fla. 1954) (emphasis added), citing Forde v. City of Miami Beach,
146 Fla. 676, 1 So. 2d 642 (1941); State ex rel. Taylor v. City of Jacksonville, 101 Fla. 1241,
133 So. 114 (1931); State ex rel. Helseth v. DuBose, 99 Fla. 812, 128 So. 4 (1930).
78. Zabel v. Pinellas County Water & Navigation Control Authority, 171 So. 2d 376, 881
(Fla. 1965).
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the setback lines imposed by the zoning ordinance were "arbitrary or un79
reasonable or an abuse of the police power."
The Ocean Villa statement was apparently based upon the test noted by
8
the Florida supreme court in Taylor v. City of Jacksonville.- Under the
Taylor rule, if the application of a zoning ordinance has the effect of "completely depriving an owner of the beneficial use of his property," the zoning
board has a duty to relax the restrictions "to prevent confiscation of a complainant's lands without compensation.s1 The Taylor test, however, is also
dictum, for the court upheld the zoning ordinance in question.
The Taylor and Ocean Villa dicta are, in turn, based upon the more general formulation announced in Helseth v. DuBose.82 In Helseth the Florida
supreme court struck down, as arbitrary and unreasonable, a zoning ordinance
preventing the erection of a jail on county property located in an undeveloped
part of the city. 3 The court stated: "The right of an owner to devote his land
to any legitimate use is properly within the terms of the Constitution, and the
Legislature may not under the guise of the police power impose unnecessary or
unreasonable restrictions upon such use." ' Coupled with such later decisions
as Ocean Villa, the Helseth doctrine indicates that an unreasonable regulatory
scheme can effect an unconstitutional taking of property. This conclusion is
supported by a related line of Florida authority involving zoning ordinances
that, although reasonable when initially drafted, became overly restrictive due
to changes in the community and physical nature of the property regulated.
In Forde v. City of Miami Beach, 5 the Supreme Court of Florida held that
a zoning ordinance must be sufficiently stable to protect those who comply with
the law, but at the same time, must be susceptible to alteration to meet changing conditions not adequately recognized or possible to foresee when the
ordinance was adopted.8 6 The ordinance under attack in Forde zoned numerous oceanfront lots for residential estates rather than for multiple family housing or hotels.8 7 Appellants contended that although the ordinance may have

79. 70 So. 2d at 902.
80. 101 Fla. 1241, 133 So. 114 (1913). Both the Ocean Villa and Taylor opinions were
authored by Justice Terrell. Serving as Chief Justice, Terrell also wrote the opinion in
Helseth v. DuBose, 99 Fla. 812, 128 So. 4 (1930).
81. 101 Fla. at 1245, 133 So. at 116, citing State ex rel. Helseth v. DuBose, 99 Fla. 812,
128 So. 4 (1930); Sundlun v. Zoning Bd. of Review, 50 R.I. 108, 145 A. 451 (1929).
82. 99 Fla. 812, 128 So. 4 (1930).
83. The court carefully explained that no proof had been made that the jail would be
a nuisance or that it would unduly affect the health, convenience, or morals of the community. 99 Fla. at 818, 128 So. at 7.
84. Id. Cf. State of Washington ex rel. Seattle Title Trust Co. v. Roberge, 278 US. 116,
121 (1928). The Helseth case was decided after Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365
(1926). See note 68 supra.
85. 146 Fla. 676, 1 So. 2d 642 (1941).
86. 146 Fla. at 682, 1 So. 2d at 645.
87. Reasons cited by the city in support of this classification included (a) protection of
land value, (b) prevention of a serious traffic problem on Collins Avenue, and (c) protection
of the general atmosphere of the area. The city also alleged that the building trend followed
after adoption of the ordinance indicated that the amount of property available for hotels
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been reasonable at the outset, changes in the character of the property made
the land unsuitable and undesirable for residential use. The effect of the zoning regulation, therefore, was to deprive them of the beneficial enjoyment of
their property. The Florida court apparently agreed, finding "that no demand
now exists for this particular property for private estates" and " that it cannot
profitably be used for residential purposes."8 8 Emphasizing that, as restricted,
the property would remain "for the present and for an unpredictable future
unimproved and unproductive," 9 the court reasoned that the value of the
land might well be consumed by the payment of annual taxes. "Mo continue
the . . . restrictions in effect would almost, if not quite, amount to a taking
without compensation and hence [be] beyond the realm of valid regulation."90
In sum, the Florida zoning cases9 indicate that an actual physical invasion
is not a prerequisite to a finding that a taking without just compensation has
occurred. Although the present approach of the United States Supreme Court
is less clear, the decisions in Mahon and Armstrong and dicta in other cases
suggest that at least some regulatory actions can effect a compensable taking
of property without a physical invasion. Just what standard the courts apply
in judging whether the government action amounts to a taking of property is
unclear. Several other judicial and academic theories, however, may be useful
in framing the required distinction.

and apartments in the area greatly exceeded the requirements in comparison to the property
available for single family construction. Id. at 680, 1 So. 2d at 644-56.
88. Id. at 683, 1 So. 2d at 646.
89. Id. at 685, 1 So. 2d at 647.
90. Id. Accord, Burritt v. Harris, 172 So. 2d 820, 822-23 (Fla. 1965). See City of Miami
Beach v. Lachman, 71 So. 2d 148, 152 (Fla. 1953) (per curiam) (city justified need to maintain zoning classification); Metropolitan Dade County v. Greenlee, 224 So. 2d 781 (3d D.C.A.
Fla. 1969); Manilow v. City of Miami Beach, 213 So. 2d 589, 593 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1968) (zoning so unreasonable as to constitute taking of property), cert. discharged, 226 So. 2d 805 (Fla.
1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 972 (1970); Smith v. City of Miami Beach, 213 So. 2d 281 (3d
D.C.A. Fla. 1968) (zoning reasonable), cert. discharged, 220 So. 2d 624 (Fla. 1969) (per
curiam); Kugel v. City of Miami Beach, 206 So. 2d 282, 284 (3d D.CA. Fla. 1968) ("Where
changed conditions create a situation where the zoning of appellants' property is so unreasonable as to constitute a taking of his property, then the courts are justified in striking
down the arbitrary zoning classification."), cert. denied, 212 So. 2d 877 (Fla. 1968), cert.
denied, 393 U.S. 1021 (1969); Lawley v. Town of Golfview, 174 So. 2d 767, 770 (2d D.CA.
Fla. 1965). Cf. Tollius v. City of Miami, 96 So. 2d 122, 126 (Fla. 1957) (need for zoning
classification so out of proportion to the interference with appellant's use of his property
that the exercise of police power could not be upheld). See also Ex parte Wise, 144 Fla. 222,
192 So. 872 (1940).
91. Dictum in Forde suggests that the standard applied in that case is similar to the
tests used in the zoning cases where no change in circumstances has occurred. Forde v. City
of Miami Beach, 146 Fla. 676, 684, 1 So. 2d 642, 647 (1941) (emphasis added): "[W]hen
property, restricted to a defined use by a zoning ordinance, changes its physical character
from natural causes to the extent that it is no longer adaptable to the use it is zoned for,
then it becomes the duty of the zoning board to relax its restrictions to prevent confiscation
just as much so as in the case where the regulation was invalid in the first instance."
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Diminution-in-Value and Loss-on-Investment
One theoretical approach available to determine when a governmental regulation effects a taking of property utilizes the magnitude of the property
owner's loss as the controlling factor.9 2 This test is consistent with the nonphysical-invasion analysis employed by Florida courts, since the nature of the
governmental power being exercised is not important. So long as the quantitative impact of the restriction is small, no taking of property will be found.
Often attributed to Mr. Justice Holmes, 93 the diminution-in-value standard
has received some judicial support. Compensation in every case involving a
slight reduction in property value cannot be allowed if contemporary government is to function effectively. 94 A taking of property, therefore, should not
be found when the governmental regulation merely prevents the owner from
using his property in its most beneficial use. If other reasonable uses are available, 95 any resulting loss of value should be minimal. On the other hand,
when the regulation goes further and prevents any reasonable use, a finding
that a compensable taking has occurred is much more likely. 96

92. See Michelman, supra note 69, at 1190-93, 1229-34; Sax supra note 22, at 50-60; Van
Alstyne, supra note 27, at 16-17; Van Alstyne, Taking or Damaging by Police Power, supra
note 17, at 37-41.
93. Tyson & Brother v. Banton, 273 U.S. 418, 445-46 (1927) (Holmes, J., dissenting);
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922) (Holmes, J.). But cf. Erie R.R. v. Public Util. Comm'rs, 254 U.S. 394, 410 (1921); Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915).
Nevertheless, Holmes is said to have complained of the "petit larceny" of the police power.
I HOLMES-LASKI L 'rRs 457 (Howe ed. 1953). Whether Holmes himself fully accepted the
diminution-of-value theory is uncertain. Michelman, supra note 69, at 1190 n.53. Professor
Binder believes that the Malhon decision is an example of the diminution-of-value test.
Binder supra note 27, at 3-4.
94. Noble State Bank v. Haskell, 219 U.S. 104, 110 (1911); Interstate Consol. St. Ry. v.
Massachusetts, 207 U.S. 79, 87 (1907); cf. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413
(1922) (where particularly small claims are involved, the cost of running the compensation
machinery itself may be prohibitive); Michelman, supra note 69, at 122 & n.105.
95. See Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962); Walls v. Midland Carbon
Co., 254 U.S. 300 (1920); Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915); Reinman v. Little
Rock, 237 U.S. 171 (1915); Consolidated Rock Prods. Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 57 Cal. 2d

515, 370 P.2d 342, 20 Cal. Rptr. 638, appeal dismissed, 371 U.S. 36 (1962); City of Miami
Beach v. Lachman, 71 So. 2d 148, 152 (Fla. 1953); Metropolitan Dade County v. Greenlee,
224 So. 2d 781, 782 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1969); City of Miami Beach v. Zorovich, 195 So. 2d 31,
36 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1967), cert. denied, 201 So. 2d 554 (Fla. 1967); Polk Enterprises, Inc. v.
City of Lakeland, 143 So. 2d 917 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1962); Levitt v. Incorporated Village of
Sands Point, 6 N.Y.2d 269, 160 N.E.2d 501, 189 N.Y.S.2d 212 (1959); McCabe v. Town of
Oyster Bay, 24 Misc. 2d 840, 209 N.Y.S.2d 697 (Sup. Ct. 1960), ajj'd sub nom., 13 App. Div.
2d 979, 217 N.Y.S.2d 161 (2d Dep't 1961).
96. See, e.g., Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40 (1960); Ex parte Kelso, 147 Cal.
609, 82 P. 241 (1905); Zabel v. Pinellas County Water & Navigation Authority, 171 So. 2d
376 (Fla. 1965); Ocean Villa Apartments, Inc. v. City of Ft. Lauderdale, 70 So. 2d 901, 902
(Fla. 1954); Forde v. City of Miami Beach, 146 Fla. 676, 1 So. 2d 642 (1941); Morris County
Land Improvement Co. v. Township of Parsippany-Troy Hills, 40 N.J. 539, 193 A.2d 232, 242
(1963); Arvene Bay Constr. Co. v. Thatcher, 278 N.Y. 222, 15 N.E.2d 587, 591-92 (1938). Cf.
Bydlon v. United States, 175 F. Supp. 891 (Ct. Cl. 1959).
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The diminution-in-value test, however, provides no standards for determining exactly where the compensation line should be drawn. 97 Although minor
pecuniary losses resulting from appropriation of negligible portions of private
real estate are usually fully compensated in eminent domain proceedings, 98
some governmental action may destroy substantial economic values with impunity.99 This deficiency does not mean that the diminution-in-value test is
not or should not be applied by the courts. To the contrary, the standard
appears to be one relevant factor in determining when a governmental regulation results in a taking of private property without just compensation. 100 As
the United States Supreme Court observed in Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, "although a comparison of values before and after [the governmental
restriction] is relevant, it is by no means conclusive."''1 1
A rare variation of the diminution-in-value test employs loss on investment
as the crucial factor. As the decision of the New York supreme court in Town
of Hempstead v. Lynne40 2 indicates, the investment-loss standard may be a
particularly helpful test in determining when a regulation prevents an owner
from making "any reasonable use" of his land.20 3
97. Van Alstyne, supra note 27, at 17. See Michelman, supra note 69, at 1191-93.
98. See FLA. STAT. chs. 73-74 (1971).
99. E.g., Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915) (diminution in value from $800,000
to $60,000); Transportation Co. v. Chicago, 99 U.S. 635 (1878); Consolidated Rock Prods. Co.
v. City of Los Angeles, 57 Cal. 2d 515, 370 P.2d 342, 20 Cal. Rptr. 368, appeal dismissed, 871
U.S. 36 (1962); Neubauer v. Town of Surfside, 181 So. 2d 707 (3d D.C.A. Fla.) (zoning; value
for permitted use, $60,000; value for proposed use, $200,000; height regulation held reasonable), cert. denied, 192 So. 2d 488 (Fla. 1966).
100. See, e.g., Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 594 (1962); Hadacheck v.
Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915); Urann v. Village of Hinsdale, 30 Ill.
2d 170, 195 N.E.2d 643
(1964); Ryan v. County of DuPage, 28 Ill. 2d 196, 190 N.E.2d 737 (1963); McCabe v. Town
of Oyster Bay, 24 Misc. 2d 840, 209 N.YS.2d 697 (Sup. Ct. 1960), aff'd sub. nom. 13 App. Div.
2d 979, 217 N.Y.S.2d 161 (2d Dep't 1961). Cf. Ocean Villa Apartments, Inc. v. City of Ft.
Lauderdale, 70 So. 2d 901, 902 (Fla. 1954). Following a careful evaluation of fifty decisions
across the nation, Professor Anderson concludes that, at least in zoning-appropriation cases, "financial loss is a relevant consideration, but not a single or decisive one." 1 R. ANDERSON,
Aa ucAN LAW OF ZONING §2.23 (1968).
101. 69 US. 590, 594 (1962).
102. 32 Misc. 2d 312, 222 N.Y.S.2d 526 (Sup. Ct. 1961). Although the "no reasonable
use" test employed in Lynne seems similar to that applied in the Florida zoning cases, Lynne
must be analyzed with care, since the New York constitution allows compensation for damagings as well as takings.
103. Id. at 317, 222 N.Y.S.2d at 532. A detailed explanation of the facts is necessary because the decision has subsequently been carefully limited. See, e.g., Kllfeather v. Town Bd.,
43 Misc. 2d 328, 330, 250 N.Y.S.2d 599, 602 (Sup. Ct. 1964) (zoning) ("[o]nly if a landowner
has incurred substantial expenditures in reliance on a particular zoning provision is a
zoning change unconstitutional as applied to his property); Udell v. McFadyen, 40 Misc. 2d
265, 270-71, 243 N.Y.S.2d 156, 162 (Sup. Ct. 1963) (zoning) (Lynne standard does not apply
to diminution in property value unless "actual and substantial" expenditures made); Rogers
v. Town of Brookhaven, 39 Misc. 2d 927, 242 N.Y.S.2d 142 (Sup. Ct. 1963) (zoning) (compensation denied where use of property under the zoning would still be profitable); Mary Chess,
Inc. v. City of Glen Cove, 38 Misc. 2d 555, 237 N.Y.S.2d 46 (Sup. Ct. 1963) (zoning) (compensation denied where some permitted use of property can be profitable), modified in part, 23
App. Div. 266, 260 N.Y.S.2d 293 (2d Dep't 1965), modified in part, 18 N.Y.S.2d 205, 273 N.Y.2d
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Over a period of years respondents in Lynne had developed most of a
400-acre tract for residential use, 29 acres having been developed during the
ten-year period prior to the court action. A separate 11-acre portion of the
tract was the subject of the suit. The residential character of respondents' developments was not protected by zoning and from 1944 to 1961 the 29-acre
area and the 11-acre tract were zoned for business purposes. The developments,
however, were protected by restrictive covenants in the deeds involved.
In June, 1960, respondents entered into a contract to sell the 11-acre tract
to several developers for use as a shopping center, contemplating that the existing business zoning would continue up to the closing date. One month after
the contract was made, respondents filed an application for a building permit.
In June, 1961, the premises were declared safe and suitable for the proposed
development. Nevertheless, after all obstacles to construction had been overcome, the Town Board considered a petition filed some 14 months earlier by
property owners in the immediate vicinity of the tract. The petition, which
requested rezoning of the 11-acre parcel from business to "residence B" was
deferred for public hearing at the end of August.
Respondents immediately demanded and were refused their building permit. They then invoked mandamus to gain issuance of the permit on August
17 and began construction on the project, which continued through September
8, 1961, when the Town Board effectively changed the zoning to "residence B."
The town then sought a permanent injunction to bar respondents from
erecting any buildings on the tract other than those permitted by the residential zoning. Respondents counterclaimed for a judgment declaring that
they had a vested right to use the parcel as a shopping center and that the
zoning ordinance, as amended on September 8, was unconstitutional as applied
to their property.
The New York supreme court rejected respondents' claim of a vested right
to use the parcel as a shopping center.' 0 4 Nevertheless, the court held that the
ordinance effected an unconstitutional confiscation of the property in question. 1 5 The test applied, substantially similar to the standard utilized by the

46, 219 N.E.2d 406 (1966) (distinction drawn between permitted uses that are technically
feasible and those that are economically feasible).
104. This important finding was based on several factors. After a "personal perusal" of
the property the court found that: (I) respondents' expenditure of $120,000 to widen roads
on the property could not be considered because of a lack of connection between the expenditure and the proposed use, (2) respondents could not claim amounts that they might
have spent to improve the property if the zoning change had not occurred, and (3) the expenditure by respondents of $15,000 in actual construction of the exterior walls of one
building of the parcel was not only insubstantial but minimal: "Substantiality is to be determined . . . by an assessment of the proportion which the expenditure bears to the total
expenditure which would be required to complete the proposed improvement." 32 Misc. 2d
at 316, 222 N.Y.S.2d at 531.
105. The court rejected on two grounds the argument that respondents had not exhausted their administrative remedies. First, the size of the parcel made any zoning variance
application futile. Second, the Board of Appeals would have had no power to overrule the
legislative zoning change granted by the Town Board. Id.
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Florida courts,' 06 was whether the restrictions imposed by the ordinance
permanently precluded "the use of the property for any purpose to which it
is reasonably adapted."' 07 Recognizing that monetary considerations are relevant in determining whether a parcel can be utilized for some reasonable
purpose, 10 the Lynne court announced the following rule: 0 9
Where... in addition to loss of most profitable use, and in addition to
actual loss of profits under a contract, an owner of property is compelled
by an ordinance either to leave land vacant for the indefinite future, or
develop it for the more restricted use at a substantial loss of his actual
investment, the land can be said not to be "reasonably" adapted to that
use and the ordinance may be held confiscatory.
The key factor supporting the holding was that respondents would have faced
a loss of investment of over $90,000 if they had been forced to develop the
property for the only purpose permitted by the amended zoning ordinance. 10
Although the New York constitution allows compensation for damagings
as well as takings, careful application of the Lynne reasoning to Florida regulatory settings seems possible. Indeed, the Lynne test offers a helpful analogy
106. See cases cited notes 34 and 77 supra. Although the Florida standard may imply
some notion of "permanence," the Arverne test expressly uses the term "permanently." 15
N.E.2d at 591.
107. 32 Misc. 2d at 319-20, 222 N.Y.S.2d at 534. In New York this test was developed in
Arverne Bay Constr. Co. v. Thatcher, 278 N.Y. 222, 232, 15 N.E.2d 587, 591 (1938).
108. Citing Arverne Bay Constr. Co. v. Thatcher, 278 N.Y. 222, 15 N.E.2d 587, 591 (1938).
For restrictions on and refinements of this notion, see Levitt v. Incorporated Village of Sands
Point, 6 N.Y.2d 629, 189 N.Y.S.2d 212, 160 N.E.2d 501 (1959); McCabe v. Town of Oyster
Bay, 24 Misc. 2d 840, 209 N.Y.S.2d 697 (Sup. Ct. 1960), aff'd sub nom., 13 App. Div. 2d 979,
217 N.Y.S.2d 161 (2d Dep't 1961).
109. 32 Misc. 2d at 318, 222 N.Y.S.2d at 532. Cf. Bernon Park Realty, Inc. v. City of Mt.
Vernon, 307 N.Y. 493, 498-99, 121 N.E.2d 517, 520 (1954). For several judicial efforts to interpret this rule conservatively, see cases cited note 103 supra.
110. The court found that respondents' total investment in the 11-acre parcel was
$351,340. Of this figure, $177,600 was the purchase price, $140,000 was for hydraulic fill to
bring the grade up to the minimum required for business development, $8,440 for the additional soil tests to comply with the building permit application requirements, $9,000 for
engineering and development plans for the proposed shopping center, and $16,300 for the
appropriate share of the cost of widening a road benefiting some 81 acres of the 400 acre
tract. The total market value of the 11-acre parcel zoned for residential purposes was $282,000
(47 plots selling for $6,000 each). However, to use the property for such purposes, respondents
would have to have expended an additional $22,000 for fill. The net value to respondents was
thus $260,000 under the "residential B" zoning. The contract for sale of the land for business purposes was $439,750, but the court did not allow compensation for loss of profits on
the contract. 32 Misc. 2d at 318-19, 222 N.Y.S.2d at 533-34.
Although the Lynne court did not acknowledge the possibility, proper calculation of the
loss on investment would seem to require some recognition of an interest factor on the
original investment. Otherwise an investor who purchased property many years before the
governmental action would seldom be able to claim an investment loss, even though he could
have earned interest on the funds used for the purchase price had he chosen to bank the
money in lieu of buying land. The interest rate utilized in calculating investment loss might
reflect an average rate paid over the period of investment. Such a rate could be based on
local savings bank interest figures or the average interest earned on local land investments.
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where an apartment developer or subdivider finds his construction plans
blocked in midstream by a combination of environmental controls and utility
requirements. Consider the following example. A developer spends $100,000
grading and filling land, pursuing mortgage commitments, and preparing
engineering plans and blueprints for an apartment project. He has purchased
the land for $300,000 with knowledge that it fronts a municipal sewer trunk
line. Although no tap-in to the sewerage system exists at the time of purchase,
the municipal plant is not running at capacity and no connection problems are
anticipated. Moreover, existing regulations allow the developer the alternative
of establishing his own "package plant" for sewerage treatment if the municipal system is operating at capacity. After the developer has expended these
funds, the state passes ecological controls prohibiting "package plants" and
requiring municipal sewer systems to provide more effective treatment. As a
result of the state regulations and continued local growth, the municipal
sewer system refuses to accept additional tap-ins. Consequently, the developer
is unable to gain a building permit for the project or, if a permit is possible,
construction cannot be begun or continued due to the lack of future waste
disposal facilities. Further, because of the restrictions on land use, the fair
market value of the tract declines to $150,000. The developer then has three
alternatives: (1) use the land in some manner that does not require sewer
connections, (2) sell the parcel, or (3) leave the land vacant indefinitely. Even
if the developer could make some use of the land by spending an additional
$25,000, the Lynne test-, should allow a claim that the governmental regulations prevent him from making any "reasonable" use of the property. Hence,
a taking of property without just compensation should be found.
In support of his claim, the developer can demonstrate that his total investment in the parcel is $400,000; the present market value of the property,
$150,000;1 2 the market value of any saleable plans and blueprints, $25,000;
and the additional expenditures necessary for him to use the property in its
restricted character, $25,000. The total value of the property to the developer
if sold would be $175,000,113 if developed in its restricted use, $150,000.114
Utilizing the three alternative uses of the land noted above, the losses faced
by the developer on his $400,000 initial investmentl-s would be: $250,000116
if the developer himself uses the land in some manner that does not require

111.

32 Misc. 2d at 317-18, 222 N.Y.S.2d at 532. See note 109 supra and accompanying

text.
112. Presumably, this figure would reflect the loss in value resulting from the governmental restrictions as well as the increase in value from any grading and filling done by the
developer.
113. Fair market value of land, $150,000, plus salvage value of any plans and blueprints,
$25,000.
114. Fair market value of land, $150,000, plus salvage value of plans and blueprints,
$25,000, minus additional cost to developer of preparing land for the restricted use, $25,000.
115. Purchase price of land, $300,000, plus amounts expended for grading and filling,
pursuing mortgage commitments, and developing plans and blueprints, $100,000.
116. Total initial investment, $400,000, minus value of land to developer if he developed
it in the restricted use, $150,000.
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sewer connections, $225,000-7 if the land is sold at its fair market value, or
approximately $225,000118 if the land is left vacant indefinitely. None of these
alternatives is a "reasonable" use to the present owner of the property.
The investment-loss figure, however, is not used to calculate the amount
of the property owner's inverse condemnation claim. Under the Florida constitution such a claim for mere "damages" would not meet the required
"taking.""19 In Florida, therefore, the loss-on-investment amount should be
utilized for the sole purpose of demonstrating that the effect of the governmental regulation is to prevent the existing owner from making any reasonable
use of the property. The conclusion that a compensable taking has occurred
then flows from the finding that the governmental restrictions make "the only
permitted uses.., those to which the property is not adapted or which are
economically unfeasible. ' 2o
The Lynne reasoning does not require that the owner prove the existence
of a "vested right" to any governmental benefits present at the time of the
owner's initial investments in the land.' 2 ' This point is helpful in our example
due to doubt that the developer could claim a vested right to sewer tap-in
facilities or statutes allowing lax environmental standards. The developer may,
however, have to claim reliance 2 upon the existing sewerage facilities and
regulations in making the substantial 23 investment in the property. In Florida
this could require proof that the developer did not have "good reason to believe, before or while acting to his detriment, that the official mind would
soon change.' 24 As the Lynne decision suggests, however, any reliance require-

117. Total initial investment, $400,000, minus fair market value of land, $150,000, and

minus salvage value of plans and blueprints.
118. This figure approximates the amount by which the present discounted value of the

right to own and develop the land for apartment complex purposes exceeds the present discounted value of the right to own and develop the land in its restricted use, both figures
being calculated in terms of the "indefinite future." Cf. 32 Misc. 2d at 317-18, 222 N.YS.2d
at 532. In a perfect market, this figure would be the same loss encountered through a sale
of the property in the first alternative cited in the text. Technically, the loss in the third
alternative would be somewhat less if the developer's special acquaintance with the property
and project allowed him an advantage over new purchasers in restarting the project at a
later date.
119. Board of Pub. Instruction v. Town of Bay Harbor Islands, 81 So. 2d 637, 642 (Fla.
1955); Arundel Corp. v. Griffin, 89 Fla. 128, 133, 103 So. 422, 424 (1925) (citing cases).
120. Morris County Land Improvement Co. v. Township of Parsippany-Troy Hills, 40

N.J. 539, 557, 193 A.2d 232, 242 (1963). See cases cited notes 74 and 77 supra.
121. 32 Misc. 2d at 316, 222 N.Y.S.2d at 531.
122. See Kilfeather v. Town Bd., 43 Misc. 2d 328, 330, 250 N.Y.S.2d 599, 602 (Sup. Ct.
1964) (zoning) ("Only if a landowner has incurred substantial expenditures in reliance on
a particular zoning provision is a zoning change unconstitutional as applied to his property.'!)
123. Udell v. McFadyen, 40 Misc. 2d 265, 270, 243 N.YS.2d 156, 162 (Sup. Ct. 1963) (zon-

ing) (Lynne standard does not apply to diminution in property value unless "actual and
substantial" expenditures made).
124. Bregar v. Britton, 75 So. 2d 753, 756 (Fla. 1954). See Gross v. City of Miami, 62 So.
2d 418 (Fla. 1953); Miami Shores Village v. Win. N. Brockway Post, 156 Fla. 673, 24 So. 2d

33 (1945). Cf. Sharrow v. City of Dania, 83 So. 2d 274 (Fla. 1955); Texas Co. v. Town of
Miami Springs, 44 So. 2d 808 (Fla. 1950), rehearingdenied, 63 So. 2d 491 (1953). See generally
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ment should be phrased in terms of the initial investment in the land and
project. The mere fact that the developer attempts to continue the project
after learning of a pending regulatory change should not prevent him from
making an inverse condemnation claim based on loss of investment. 125 The
appropriate solution would be to exclude from the "total investment" figure
any expenditures made after the developer receives notice of a future regulatory change.128
As interesting as the Lynne test appears, two caveats should be noted. First,
the implicit assumptions involved in allowing compensation to turn upon
loss on investment may be misleading. The Lynne approach, essentially, seems
to assume that all land developers do well on their investments. Florida real
estate prices may continue to escalate, thus making the Lynne assumption
realistic. But in areas where the market price of real estate is less than the
owner's original investment the theoretical validity of using investment loss
to determine when a taking of property occurs seems more questionable. Second, investment loss should not be considered a complete substitute for more
comprehensive compensation theories. 127 Evidence of substantial investment
loss is only one of several factors available to demonstrate that no reasonable
use of the affected property can be made. The criterion may be of little use in
borderline situations involving minor investment loss. Moreover, an absence
of investment loss need not prevent finding a compensable taking.
Even with these limitations, investment loss is a more helpful compensation
standard than dimunition-in-value. Evidence of substantial investment loss
resulting from reasonable reliance upon existing statutes and sanitary disposal
facilities should create a strong presumption of a compensable taking. On the
other hand, proof of dimunition-in-market value does not create such a presumption, although evidence of such a reduction can be a relevant factor in
determining whether a taking has occurred." 2 Both standards seem consonant
with Florida cases utilizing the "no reasonable use" test for zoning regulations."29 Moreover, both seem adaptable to the environmental regulation-utility
requirement context.
Note, Effect of Pending or Subsequently Proposed and Enacted Legislation on Applications
NOTRE DAME LAW. 109, 112 (1958).
125. For example, in Lynne the developer began construction immediately upon receiving the building permit in a mandamus action. Even though the developer was aware of
the pending change, construction continued until the Town Board passed the new zoning
classification. 32 Misc. 2d at 314, 222 N.Y.S.2d at 529.
126. This approach may have been used in the Lynne decision. Calculation of the developers' investment in that case included the cost of engineering and development plans
for the shopping center as well as a portion of the cost of widening a road, which benefited
the subject tract and a larger area. Although construction of the shopping center itself was
underway from August 17 through September 8, 1961, none of the $15,000 expended for that
purpose was included in the total investment figures used by the court in calculating loss of
investment. 32 Misc. 2d at 315, 318-19, 222 N.Y.S.2d at 530, 533.
127. See the discussions of the balancing test, the harm prevention-benefit extraction
distinction, the enterprise function versus arbitral function approach, and the fairness standard, in the text, infra.
128. See cases cited note 100 supra.
129. See cases cited notes 74 and 77 supra.

for Building Permits, 34
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Balancing
Another approach for determining when a compensable taking has occurred involves a balancing test.130 Under this standard, so long as the social
gains resulting from governmental encroachment on property rights "outweigh" the private detriment, no compensation need be provided.
Whether derived from common law nuisance liability 31 or the contemporary perception of litigation as a process for the resolution of conflicts between
competing social and economic interests, 3 2 balancing is a rational and flexible
technique for molding a body of inverse condemnation law. 133 The test offers
a rough approximation of the extent to which the government has forced unnecessary or severe losses upon individual citizens without offering financial
relief or corresponding economic amenities. At the very least, a balancing
process delineates the most obvious cases for and against compensation.
On the other hand, a balancing analysis suffers from serious inadequacies.
The approach assumes that courts and juries are capable of making reasonably accurate quantitative comparisons between the essentially dissimilar factors of public interest and private detriment. Even if the relevant interests can
be identified and assessed in some fashion, the balancing may be unduly subjective. Unless dear rules are developed over time, a balancing technique may
make the predictability of results difficult or impossible.
Depending upon the type of balancing employed, serious constitutional
and ethical questions may be raised. Balancing may permit the sacrifice of the
property of some members of society, without compensation, for the benefit
of others or for society as a whole. If no solid criteria exist for distinguishing
between the persons benefited and those harmed, use of balancing seems
ethically indefensible and constitutionally questionable.' 3 ' The concept of
balancing, however, may also mean that compensation will be denied only
when all members of the community, including those whose property has been
taken, have received a reciprocal advantage to offset their losses. Even so, such
an approach may allow some members of the community to receive valuable
gratuitous benefits.135 Whether such result conflicts with the egalitarian ethic
130. See generally Kratovil & Harrison, Eminent Domain -Policy and Concept, 42 CALip.
L. REy. 596, 626-29 (1954); Michelman, supra note 69, at 1193-96, 1234-35; Van Alstyne, supra
note 27, at 17-19.

131. See Kratovil &Harrison, supra note 130, at 611-12.
132. See 3 R. POUND, JUEIsPRUDENCE ch. 14 (1959); Fuller, American Legal Realism, 82
U. PA. L. REv. 429 (1934).
133. Michelman, supra note 69, at 1235. Professor Binder is a strong advocate of the

balancing approach. In urging certain modifications to the traditional balancing method, he
observes: "The main problem with the balancing tests previously proposed is that, aside

from a simple statement of the principles to be considered in balancing, no attempt is made
to weigh and analyze the varying factors. Certain considerations are obviously more important
than others and should bear more weight." Binder, supra note 27, at 10.
134. Michelman, supra note 69, at 1195. Cf. L. Maxcy, Inc. v. Mayo, 103 Fla. 552, 570,
139 So. 121, 129 (1932).
135. See United States v. Sponenbarger, 308 U.S. 256 (1937) (floodway project, compensa-

tion denied).
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of American society largely depends upon whether such windfall benefits will
eventually be shared by all citizens, either by random selection or through
1 36
governmentally-imposed redistribution mechanisms.
Despite these problems, the balancing technique has received some judicial
support.1 3. Two opinions by Justice Holmes 3s and one decision in which he

136. Michelman, supra note 69, at 1196.
137. E.g., United States v. Central Eureka Mining Co., 357 U.S. 155 (1958); Pennsylvania
Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413-14 (1922); Erie R.R. v. Public Util. Comm'rs, 254 U.S.
394, 410 (1921); Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915); Albers v. County of Los Angeles,
62 Cal. 2d 250, 398 P.2d 129, 42 Cal. Rptr. 89 (1965); Consolidated Rock Prods. Co. v. City
of Los Angeles, 57 Cal. 2d 515, 370 P.2d 342, 20 Cal. Rptr. 638, appeal dismissed, 371 U.S.
36 (1962); Tollius v. City of Miami, 96 So. 2d 122, 126 (Fla. 1957); Forde v. City of Miami
Beach, 146 Fla. 676, 1 So. 2d 642 (1941); Metropolitan Dade County v. Pierce, 236 So. 2d 202,
203 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1970).
138. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922); Erie R.R. v. Public Util.
Comm'rs, 254 U.S. 394 (1921). In Mahon Justice Holmes noted that, on one side of the
balance, the public interest in minimizing danger to the "single private house" involved was
"limited." 260 U.S. at 393. "On the other hand," he explained, "the extent of the taking [was]
great." Id. at 413-14. Considering the statute solely from the plaintiff's position, therefore,
the legislation did not disclose a public interest sufficient to warrant "so extensive a destruction of the defendant's constitutionally protected rights." Id. Justice Holmes went further,
however, and discussed the general validity of the act. That he did so suggests that even if a
balancing technique is used, the "harm" involved should be gauged in terms of all potential
plaintiffs and not merely the individual whose property is taken in the instant case. As
noted previously, the test formulated in Mahon seems to turn upon substantial impairment
of all uses to which the property might reasonably be put. The unanswered question is
whether Justice Holmes meant to define the concept of "reasonable use" by balancing the
harm inflicted on the property owner against the public benefits flowing from the act or by
measuring without regard for the public benefits involved. Given the inexact nature of this
approach, the suggestion that at least a limited balancing technique was used seems sound.
In Erie New Jersey required the railroad to eliminate certain grade crossings by running
railroad tracks over or beneath the public streets. The railroad was essentially required to
bear the full expense of the plan. In another Holmes' opinion, the Court affirmed the state's
power to require the railroad to implement the plan. Reasoning that an adjustment of two
conflicting interests was involved, Holmes found that the interest of the public in using its
streets was paramount to that of the railroad and its customers. 254 U.S. at 410-11. To
Holmes, the state was not constitutionally required to consider the economic ability of the
railroad to make the required expenditures. Id. at 411.
Whether Erie is applicable to other fact-settings is questionable for three reasons. First,
Justice Holmes' comments seem particularly applicable to governmental actions designed to
protect the health and safety of the public. Second, although Holmes stated that the ability
of the railroad to bear the cost was not a constitutional consideration, he admitted that the
courts below found that the expense imposed "would not be ruinous." Id. Third, that a
railroad was involved may have been crucial. Although Holmes cautioned that the "power
of the State over grade crossings derives little light from cases on the power to regulate
trains," he also commented that the state was the source from which the railroads "ultimately
. . . derive their right to occupy the land." Id. at 410. Cf. Brooks-Scanlon Co. v. Railroad
Comm'n of Louisiana, 251 U.S. 396, 399 (1920) (Holmes, J.): "It is true that if a railroad
continues to exercise the power conferred upon it by a charter from a State, the State may
require it to fulfill an obligation [e.g., to operate in the 'public interest'] imposed by the
charter even though fulfillment in that particular may cause a loss." The still-unanswered
question, however, is whether Justice Holmes would have applied the same limit in Erie if
wholly private property were involved.
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participated3 9 suggest that the degree of economic harm inflicted by an alleged
taking must be balanced against the magnitude of the public need embodied
in the challenged governmental action.
Several Florida decisions also seem to reflect a balancing approach. In
Zabel v. Pinellas County Water & Navigation Control Authority, 40 the Florida supreme court held that denial by the Authority of permission to fill submerged lands in Boca Ceiga Bay amounted to a taking of property without
just compensation. 4' On first analysis, Zabel seems merely to reflect the view
that a property owner may not be denied all reasonable use of his land without compensation. Thus, the court's opinion notes that appellants' "statutory
rights to dredge, fill and bulkhead the land subject to reasonable limitations,"

139. Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915). In Hadacheck the Supreme Court
considered whether a Los Angeles ordinance prohibiting the manufacture of bricks within
certain areas of the city required compensation for an owner of clay beds and brick manufacturing equipment. Petitioner owned a valuable bed of clay, which he had excavated to an
extent that the land could not be utilized for residential purposes. Machinery to manufacture
bricks from the clay had been erected on the property. Petitioner alleged that by denying
brick manufacturing on the land, the ordinance would "entirely deprive [him] of his property and the use thereof." 239 U.S. at 405, 408. The ordinance did not, however, prohibit
removal of the clay for manufacture of bricks at another location. The Supreme Court refused to invalidate the ordinance as an unconstitutional taking. Noting the necessity for the
march of progress, Mr. Justice McKenna reasoned that even though the regulation might
"seem harsh in its exercise . . . the imperative necessity for its existence precludes any
limitation upon it when not exerted arbitrarily." Id. at 410. The Court thus implied that the
public interest in limiting the areas used for brickmaking outweighed the private economic
harm inflcted by the ordinance. The Hadacheck Court expressly reserved the question of
whether a different approach might have been mandated if the petitioner had been prohibited from mining clay for the production of brick at another location. Id. at 412. The
Court thus distinguished Ex parte Kelso, 147 Cal. 609, 82 P. 241 (1905), where the California
supreme court invalidated an ordinance absolutely prohibiting the maintenance or operation
of a rock or stone quarry within a certain portion of San Francisco.
140. 171 So. 2d 376, 381 (Fla. 1965) (three judges dissented).
141. The result reached by the Fifth Circuit in Zabel v. Tabb, 430 F.2d 199 (5th Cir.
1970), rev'g 296 F. Supp. 764 (M.D. Fla. 1969), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 910 (1971), does not
affect the decision of the Florida supreme court in Zabel v. Pinellas County Water &rNavigation Control Authority, even though the same land and property owners were involved in
both cases. The Fifth Circuit refused to find a taking, explaining that the landowner who
bought the submerged property from the state had not received a fee simple interest: "The
waters and underlying land are subject to the paramount servitude in the Federal government which the Submerged Lands Act expressly reserved as an incident of power incident to
the Commerce Clause." 430 F.2d at 215. See Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective JudicialIntervention, 68 MiCH. L. Rv. 471, 524 n.157, 528 n.174 (1970).
See generally F. MAL.ONEY, S. PLAGER & F. BALDWIN, WATER LAW AND ADMINISTRATION: THE
FLORIDA ExpERIENcE ch. 12 (1968). The result of the federal and state decisions in the Zabel
cases may be that the state is restrained from denying the dredging and filling permits without compensation while the federal government faces no such restriction because no taking
exists under federal law. Professor Little suggests that a fairer result to the frustrated landowners in the federal cases may be to "treat the denial of permits in the nature of inverse
condemnation and require compensation based on whatever value the land might have in its
natural state without rights of exploitation." Little, supra note 1, at 495. Professor Little
leaves open the question of who would pay for the taking. Id. 495 n.227.
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were the "only present rights attributable to ownership of the submerged land
itself."'142 Such rights could not be denied, explained the court, and the owners
"deprived of the only beneficial use of their property without compensation."1*3
On closer analysis, however, the court's opinion is far more suggestive of a
balancing approach under which the Authority had not demonstrated a public
need that would justify the restrictions imposed. The court stated "it was not
established that the granting of the permit would materially and adversely
affect the public interest.'" 4 4 Indeed, for purposes of the Zabel case, the court
conceded "that, under certain conditions, a police power could, by prohibiting
filling or dredging, deprive the owner of any valuable use of his property."'' 4 5
The court based this questionable assumption upon a statement in Corneal v.
46
State Plan Board:
[T]he absolute destruction of property is an extreme exercise of the
police power and is justified only within the narrowest limits of actual
necessity, unless the state chooses to pay compensation.
The view that a sufficient showing of "necessity" may justify a governmental action that, without compensation, prevents a property owner from
making any reasonable use of his land also appears in several Florida zoning
decisions. The cases involving the validity of zoning ordinances under
"changed circumstances" are particularly instructive. Striking down the existing zoning classification in Burritt v. Harris,147 the Florida supreme court
explained that an owner will not be required to sacrifice his property rights
"absent a substantial need for restrictions in the interest of the public health,
morals, safety or welfare." As Justice Caldwell reasoned: "If the zoning restriction exceeds the bounds of necessity for the public welfare, as, in our
opinion, do the restrictions controverted here, they must be stricken as an unconstitutional invasion of property rights.' 48 Similarly, upholding the zoning
classification in City of Miami Beach v. Lachman1 9 the Florida court observed
that the adverse effects "must be weighed against the public welfare or the
effect on the community at large."'' 50
In Tollius v. City of Miami'5 ' the court found that the need for a particular zoning classification had been dissipated by the phenomenal growth

142. 171 So. 2d at 381. Cf. Hayes v. Bowman, 91 So. 2d 795, 800 (Fla. 1957).
143. 171 So. 2d at 381.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 379.
146. 95 So. 2d 1, 4 (Fla. 1957).
147. 172 So. 2d 820, 823 (Fla. 1965).
148. Id.
149. 71 So. 2d 148, 152 (Fla. 1953), appeal dismissed, 348 U.S. 906 (1955).
150. Id. The fact that the properties involved would be much more valuable in a different zoning classification than in their existing classification did not determine whether
the ordinance was "fairly debatable" and therefore constitutional.
151. 96 So. 2d 122 (Fla. 1957).
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of the metropolitan area since the ordinance was passed. Thus, the court held
that the need was "so out of proportion to the interference with the use of the
52
appellant's property" that exercise of police power could not be upheld.
In each of these decisions the rule expressed was that governmental action
that prevents an owner from making any reasonable use of his land effects a
taking of property. However, the court implied that in some instances a showing of actual public necessity can justify severe restrictions upon private property. No decision researched for this study directly holds that compensation
need not be paid when the governmental action involved prevents the property from being utilized in its only reasonable use. Moreover, if a showing of
public need can ever justify such a result, no decision explains the amount of
public interest or benefit necessary to support a finding of the requisite "actual
necessity."
On balance, the view that a showing of necessity can prevent a finding of
a compensable taking seems highly questionable. Even if evidence of public
need should prevent payment of compensation, the degree of public necessity
should not determine whether a "taking" of property has or has not occurred.
Under the Florida constitution, private property cannot be taken except for

a "public purpose."1 51 3 Put very simply, the constitutional provision prevents
"takings" without full compensation. Nothing in the language used suggests
that the constitutional prohibition can be rendered ineffective by a mere showing of some unknown degree of public "necessity."
Even if evidence of "actual necessity" can in some instances justify a taking

of property without compensation, the serious and unusual consequences of
authorizing such result demand a more objective test than the balancing approach provides. 5 4 Courts searching for an improved standard might be welladvised to reject any legislative claim of "actual necessity" that does not expressly approve the resulting encroachment upon private property rights. In
format, their judicial approach might be similar to the mechanics used by
courts under the Massachusetts version 55 of the public trust doctrine.56 If

152. Id.'ai 126.
153. FLA. CONSr. art. X, §6(a).
154. See notes 133-136 supra and accompanying text.
155. E.g., Robins v. Department of Pub. Works, 355 Mass. 328, 244 N.E.2d 577, 580
(1969); "We think it is essential to the expression of plain and explicit authority to divert
parklands, Great Ponds, reservations and kindred areas to a new and inconsistent public use
that the Legislature identify the land and that there appear in the legislation not only a
statement of the new use but a statement or recital showing in some way legislative awareness
of the existing public use. In short, the legislation should express not merely the public will
for the new use but its willingness to surrender or forgo the existing use." See Gould v.
Greylock Reservation Comm., 350 Mass. 410,215 N.E.2d 114 (1966).
156-See generally Sax, supra note 141. No suggestion is made that all public trust
criteria are present in the taking-without-just-compensation context. Nevertheless, that the
government, as representative of the people, must hold constitutional rights in trust for all
citizens is hardly a surprising concept. For a detailed discussion of the Massachusetts public
trust doctrine, see id. at 491-509. Not all approaches to the public trust doctrine involve a
"remand" to the legislature. The general public trust concept has been recognized in Florida.
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the court found that governmental action deprived the owner of all reasonable
use of his property, a compensable taking would be found unless the government could adequately demonstrate that some quantum of "actual necessity"
justified refusing compensation. Even then, the court would require payment
of compensation unless the authorizing legislation included an explicit finding that the public need justified a taking without payment of compensation.
This analogy to the public trust approach is not meant to condone such a
balancing technique. Rather, two purposes are reflected: first, to offer a means
by which courts intent on applying an ultimate balancing test might provide
more complete protection to private property rights; and, second, to demonstrate the serious risk that a balancing test, even coupled with public trust
doctrine mechanics, poses to the constitutional rights of real property owners.
Applied to environmental regulations and utility requirements, the Florida
balancing approach offers no ready answers. Certainly the public purposes behind these government promulgations are important. Whether the health and
ecological benefits involved are adequate to warrant a finding of "actual necessity" is unclear, as is the impact of such finding on the question of whether
a compensable taking of property has occurred. Several implications, however,
are apparent. First, the dicta in Florida cases which suggest use of a balancing
approach offer tremendous potential for judicial discretion. Given the present
judicial awareness of the need to protect the environment, an enterprising
trial judge could easily refuse to find a taking because of an important public
need for the regulations involved. That such a ruling would survive on appeal
seems unlikely, but hardly impossible. Second, although balancing seems apparent in some Florida cases, where the owner has clearly been deprived of all
reasonable use of his property a "taking" has been found. Even under a balancing technique, therefore, precedent would support a finding of a compensable
taking in an environmental regulation-utility requirement situation. Although
the public need for such regulations must not be underestimated, the social
and political impact of depriving an individual of all reasonable use of his
land is also strong. Third, to the extent that a court might apply public trust
doctrine mechanics in the environmental regulation context, a compensable
taking would probably be found. One of the most pervasive factors in the
utility restriction area is the indirect or consequential manner by which private
property rights are diminished.
The Distinction Between Harm Prevention and Benefit Extraction

Aside from the judicially developed doctrines distinguishing between compensable takings and non-compensable regulations of property, commentators
have also searched for workable solutions. Professor Dunham's theory uses as
157
the key factor the purpose of the governmental interference with land use.

Brickell v. Trammell, 77 Fla. 544, 559, 82 So. 221, 226 (1919); State ex rel. Ellis v. Gerbing,
56 Fla. 603, 47 So. 353 (1908); FLA. STAT. §§253.12, 307.16 (1971).
157. Dunham, A Legal and Economic Basis for City Planning, 58 COLUM. L. REv. 650,

663-69 (1958).
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Thus, if the primary effect of governmental action is to prevent nuisance-like
conduct in order to protect the health and welfare of the community, compensation need not be awarded. On the other hand, if the restriction compels the
property owner to confer a benefit upon the public, compensation must be
paid.1s
Under this analysis, harm-prevention regulation is generally narrow and
particular in scope, "aimed [at] elimination of a detrimental use, but leaving
a broad area in which private options are available for engaging in other useful but non-harmful activities."159 In contrast, governmental action that compels a private party to benefit the community tends to impose more comprehensive restrictions upon private choices, "leaving the owner free only to
abandon all activities that are economically feasible or engage in the kind of
use which will confer the desired public benefit.16 0 Phrased in these terms,

the Dunham approach bears strong resemblance to a distinction drawn in
161
Freund's landmark treatise on the police power:
It may be said that the state takes property by eminent domain because
it is useful to the public, and under the police power because it is
harmful.... From this results the difference between the power of
eminent domain and the police power, that the former recognizes a right
to compensation while the latter on principle does not.
Case law does seem to reflect some distinction between harm prevention
and benefit extraction. 1 2 The first Mr. Justice Harlan may have used such an
approach as an alternative principle in Mugler v. Kansas.1 63 In certain fact
settings the line between prevention of harm and extraction of benefit can be
drawn with some clarity. For example, an owner cannot be compelled to use

158. See generally Michelman, supra note 69, at 1196-1201, 1235-45; Sax, supra note 22,
at 48-50; Van Alstyne, supra note 27, at 19-21; Van Alstyne, supra note 17, at 23-26.
159. Van AIstyne, supra note 27, at 20.
160. Id.
161. E. FREuND, THE PoLI E PowaR §511, at 546-47 (1904); see Dunham, supra note 157,
at 664-65.
162. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. v. Public Util. Comm'n, 356 U.S. 346 (1953); Nashville C. &
St. L. .y. v. Walters, 294 US. 405, 429 (1935); Reichelderfer v. Quinn, 287 U.S. 315 (1932);
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 416-18 (1922) (Brandeis, J., dissenting);
Gardner v. Michigan, 199 U.S. 325 (1905); Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 669 (1887); Fertilizing Co. v. Hyde Park, 97 U.S. 659 (1878); Pasternack v. Bennett, 138 Fla. 663, 190 So. 56
(1939) (prohibition against use of property declared by valid legislation to be injurious to
the health, morals, or safety of the community cannot be deemed a taking or appropriation
of property for the public benefit for which compensation must be paid); State ex rel. Davis
v. Rose, 97 Fla. 710, 122 So. 225 (1929) (statutory regulation of real estate brokers, including
creation of state real estate commission, not invalid as a taking of property without just
compensation); Pompano Horse Club v. State ex rel. Bryan, 93 Fla. 415, 111 So. 801 (1927)
(use of injunctions to prohibit operation or maintenance of premises used for gambling or
games of chance approved). Cf. United States v. Central Eureka Mining Co., 357 U.S. 155,
179 (1958) (Harlan, J., dissenting); United States v. Caltex, Inc., 344 U.S. 149, 156 (Douglas
J., dissenting).
163. 123 U.S. 623, 669 (1887). See note 34 supra and accompanying text.
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6
his land as a parking lot so that the community will gain parking facilities,1 4
but he can be ordered to provide a lot for the parking needs of activities on
his own land.1 65 An owner cannot be required, without compensation, to leave
his land vacant so that the property may be used as public open-space or saved
for future government purchase, 66 but he may be compelled to leave a portion
of the property unused where building would be harmful to the use and enjoyment of other land. 67 A ban on brickyards in a residential neighborhood
may' 65 or may not 6 9 be constitutionally acceptable, but without compensation
the state may not limit the use of commercially valuable land to a bird
70
sanctuary
In other circumstances the distinction between harm prevention and benefit extraction is less clear.1Y1 An ordinance restricting the height of structures
within an airport approach zone may be viewed as a compensable taking that
confers improved airport service or as a noncompensable limitation on tall
buildings that threaten the safety of users and neighbors of adjacent airport
property. 7 2 A provision conditioning housing construction upon installation
of an adequate sewer system' 7 ' may be seen as an effort to protect the public
from the noxious effects of improperly-treated sewerage. Similarly, a state law
prohibiting a municipal sewerage treatment facility from operating at overcapacity" 4 may be designed to prevent harm to the public. But when several
regulations involving sewerage facilities and subdivision requirements converge to compel an owner to postpone all development on his property indefinitely, the distinction between harm prevention and benefit extraction becomes less meaningful. Indeed, in situations where the harm-benefit line can-

164. Vernon Park Realty Co. v. Mount Vernon, 307 N.Y. 493, 121 N.E.2d 517 (1954),
noted in 68 HARv. L. REv. 1089 (1955).
165. See New Orleans v. Leeco, Inc., 226 La. 335, 76 So. 2d 387 (1954) (by implication).
166. Gait v. County of Cook, 405 Ill. 396, 91 N.E.2d 395 (1950); cf. Beck v. Littlefield, 68
So. 2d 889, 890 (Fla. 1953) (dictum: any attempt by city to ordain that a property owner
may not erect any building on his land would run afoul of the guaranty of due process).
167. Gorieb v. Fox, 274 U.S. 603 (1927); City of Miami v. Homer, 58 So. 2d 849 (Fla.
1952), revised, 73 So. 2d 285 (1954). But cf. Mayer v. Dade County, 82 So. 2d 513 (Fla. 1955).
168. Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915).
169. In re Kelso, 147 Cal. 609, 82 P. 241 (1905).
170. Morris County Land Improvement Co. v. Township of Parsippany-Troy Tills, 40
NJ. 539, 193 A.2d 232 (1963).
171. Professor Dunham has acknowledged the potential difficulty involved in this area.
He admits that one might argue that elimination of a nuisance technically confers a public
benefit. He asserts, however, that "[p]ractially speaking . . . the benefit resulting from
elimination of a harm does not result from any particular land use; the benefit results from
non-use in a particular way rather than from any of the permissible uses." Dunham, supra
note 157, at 664-65.
172. Van AIstyne, supra note 27, at 20 & n.96. See Yara Eng'r Corp. v. City of Newark,
132 N.J.L. 370, 40 A.2d 559 (1945).
173. For examples of municipal subdivision requirement ordinances see note 2 supra.
See generally 2 P. Nscuots, supra note 15, §§6-12.
174. This result could occur indirectly as well as directly; for example, a law imposing
strict new pollution standards would indirectly influence the treatment capacity of a sewage
plant.
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not be sketched with clarity, the Dunham standard risks subjective factual
assessments and conclusionary reasoning.
Nevertheless, the harm prevention-benefit extraction concept may prove
useful when phrased in terms of cost internalization. 7 5 Under this view, no
compensation would be required where the effect of governmental action is
merely to force the landowner to internalize a presently external social cost
directly resulting from his use of the property. Payment of compensation in
such circumstances would be inappropriate because the only effect of the
governmental action is to require the landowner to consider all "enterprise"
costs when determining how to utilize his property. 7 6 Consider the developer
who plans to construct a large apartment complex on the banks of a scenic
river in central Florida. The developer will treat construction materials as a
cost of development and repair and management expenses as costs of operation. But if sewage from the complex can be given minor "primary" treatment and then dumped into the adjacent river, only part of the total cost
associated with that sewage will be included in the developer's cost of doing
business. The expense of constructing and operating the primary treatment
plant, of course, will be an "internal" or "enterprise" cost. But the "social"
cost of having inadequately treated sewage befouling local waterways will be
"externalized" and borne either by society as a whole or by the more limited
public that utilizes the river.77 Under the Dunham view, a regulation requiring the developer to provide more adequate sewage treatment facilities would
not require compensation because the effect of the governmental action would
be harm prevention. Under a cost internalization analysis, the same result
would occur, but for the slightly different reason that the governmental action
merely requires the developer to recognize a legitimate cost of "doing business"
78
or utilizing his property for a particular use.'
The cost internalization standard is particularly helpful when applied to
areas in which the distinction between harm prevention and benefit extraction
is difficult to delineate. Consider the following fact-setting in which a land
developer is faced with converging environmental regulations and utility requirements. Viewed separately, the regulations and statutes require developers
to install adequate sanitary sewer facilities on all newly-developed land, impose
175. The terms of contemporary economic analysis of the differences between enterprise
("internal") and social ("external') costs and their consequences derive largely from Pigou,
who wrote: "[O]ne person A in the course of rendering some service, for which payment is
made, to a second person B, incidentally also renders services or disservices to other persons
... of such a sort that payment cannot be exacted from the benefited parties or compensation enforced on behalf of the injured parties." A. PIGou, THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE 183
(4th ed. 1932). See generally Coarse, The Problems of Social Cost, 3 J. LAW & ECON. 1 (1960);
Katz, supra note 7, at 592-93; Katz, Decision-making in the Production of Power, 225 SciE.urinrc Am. 191 (1971).
176. Cf. A. PIoOU, supra note 175, at 172: "It might happen for example ... that costs
are thrown upon people not directly concerned, through, say, uncompensated damage done
to surrounding woods by sparks from railway engines. All such elements must be includedsome of them will be positive, others negative elements-in reckoning up the social net
product of the marginal increment of any volume of resources turned into any use or place."
177. Cf. Katz, supra note 7, at 592-93.
178. See note 176 supra; cf. Katz, supra note 7, at 592.
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strict new pollution limits on municipal and private sewage treatment facilities, and prohibit use of "package plant" or individualized sewage treatment
facilities in most areas. A owns Sunacre, an existing apartment development
in Orlando. A pays property taxes on the value of both the land and apartment buildings and A's tenants pay small user-fees for municipal sewer service.
Since the development's completion, it has been connected to the municipal
sewage treatment plant.
For some years environmentalists had been warning city authorities that
the municipal sewage facility provided inadequate treatment of phosphates
and some organic matter. Critics alleged that effluent from the plant was excessive in biological oxygen demand (BOD).17 9 Following passage of strict new
environmental protection laws on state and federal levels, the city was forced
to recognize the validity of these criticisms and to provide better sewage treatment by an announced deadline. Having limited funds, the easiest method for
the city to postpone construction of new tertiary treatment facilities was to
reduce capacity at existing plants. Alternatively, under the new regulations the
city found it financially impossible to increase existing capacity as had been
done regularly over the past decade.
C, owner of Funacre, a prime parcel of undeveloped land in the western
part of the city, had paid a premium several years ago to buy land in an area
served by the municipal sewer system. She is unable to develop the property
because the municipal treatment plant is running at capacity and not accepting new tap-ins. C, therefore, offers to pay the full cost of installing a "package
plant" sewage facility to service the planned development, but existing city
sewer ordinances and new environmental laws prohibit the installation of such
units within the city limits.
Applying cost internalization concepts to this situation, C should be required to internalize the expense of providing adequate sewage treatment for
any waste water generated by the apartment project. Allowing C to escape this
responsibility would require society to bear this element of C's enterprise costs.
C, however, has offered to fulfill this responsibility by either connecting the
apartment to the municipal treatment plant or building a "package plant" to
serve the apartment development. The first alternative is rejected because the
city cannot afford to increase the capacity of the municipal treatment plant,
due to more stringent pollution limitations. The second alternative is refused
because (a) financial and managerial considerations require that the city
operate all treatment plants within the municipal limits, and (b) adequate
protection of the environment can be gained only through use of centralized,
well-run, and easily-inspected plants. Although each of these reasons benefits
the community as a whole, C is unable to make any reasonable use of her
property.
179. For explanations of the technical aspects of sewage treatment, see J. CLARK &
VIESSMAN, JR., WATER SUPPLY AND POLLUTION CONTROL (1966); ENVIRONMENTAL STUDY
GROUP, NATIONAL ACADEMIES OF SCIENCES & ENGINEERING, WATER QUALITY IN SOUTH FLORIDA,
PART II (1970); S. GRAVE, URUBAN PLANNING ASPECTs OF WATER POLLUTION CONTROL (1969);

W.

A. KNESSE & B. BowER,
(1968).

MANAGING WATER QUALITY:
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The crucial question is whether the burden imposed on C exceeds the
internalization of enterprise costs. In this situation the burden is excessive.
Even if C's proposed private treatment facility would fully protect the public
health and environment, thus internalizing all costs of sewage treatment, C
must bear additional costs. C is compelled to internalize costs due not to her
proposed development of the land, but to the general community problems of
environmental degradation and inadequate sewage treatment facilities. The
costs of earlier, improper planning and careless treatment of the environment 8 0 are being thrust upon C to such an extent that she can no longer make

any reasonable use of her property.
From a policy standpoint, the question is whether C should be required to
sacrifice the development rights to her property so that A and other local
taxpayers will not have to suffer the higher tax rates or sewer-use fees necessary
to expand the municipal sewerage system or to compensate C for her loss.
Viewed under the Dunham approach, the substantial effect"' of the governmental actions is to extract a public benefit at C's expense. Translated into
contemporary terms, C is required to internalize a public or socal cost unrelated to her enterprise use of Funacre. In each case, the public element is so
severe as to deprive C of any reasonable use of her property. Under either
analysis, a taking of property without just compensation should be found.
EnterpriseFunction Versus Arbitral Function
Professor Sax has proposed a compensation theory'8 2 somewhat related to
the benefit extraction concept. 8 3 Sax asserts that the analytical distinction
should be between "the role of government as participant and... as mediator
in the process of competition among economic claims."'18 When private economic loss results from governmental enhancement of its resource position in
an enterprise or participant capacity, then compensation is constitutionally
required. But when such loss is a consequence of the government's acceptance

180. See Marshall, Who's Responsible for Pollution?, 57 A.B.A.J. 21 (1971).
181. The effect of the governmental actions can be calculated in terms of two components: (1) the burden imposed on the developer, which can fairly be said to result from
a forced internalization of the enterprise costs of treating sewage resulting from the development; and (2) the burden imposed, which represents the developer's "unfair share" of
the community costs associated with inadequate planning and improper sewage treatment
over a long period. When factor (2) reaches a substantial level, the hypothesis is that the
developer will be unable to make any reasonable use of her property. A compensable taking
should then be found.
The effective prohibition of new construction in this situation should not be confused
with less severe ordinances that, especially in connection with urban renewal projects, attempt to regulate or forbid construction for a relatively short period of time. See 2 P. Nicstos,
supra note 15, §6.351. Cf. Board of Comm'rs v. Tallahassee Bank & Trust Co., 108 So. 2d
74 (1st D.CA. Fla. 1958) (compensation allowed), afl'd, 116 So. 2d 762 (Fla. 1959).
182. Sax, supra note 22, at 62. See also Note, Public Use Doctrine: "Advance Requiem"
Revisited, 1969 LAw & SOC-AL ORDER 688.

183. See notes 157-181 supra and accompanying text.
184. Sax, supra note 22,at 62.
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of an arbitral role in society, then no compensation need be paid.8 5 Rejecting
the position that protection of existing economic values is central to the
"eminent domain clauses," the Sax theory is based upon the view that the
framers of those clauses were primarily concerned with preventing unfair or
arbitrary governmental action'8 6
The Sax analysis is complicated by two exceptions to the general compensation test. First, compensation is denied where a property restriction clearly
enhances the resource position of a governmental enterprise and the owner
of the restricted property receives "benefits which equal or exceed the detriment imposed."'' s7 An example of this concept is found in the compulsory subdivision dedication laws,1s s which require a developer to dedicate some portion
of his tract for roads, schools, and parks. In theory, the promise of urban

185. Professor Sax distinguishes this approach from that of Justice Harlan on two
counts: First, the finding of an enhancement of the government's resource position does not
necessarily require a physical invasion or an acquisition of a formal proprietary interest.
Second, non-compensability will turn not on a finding that governmental action is a "mere
restriction upon use," but rather on an examination of the identities of the parties involved
and of the government's role in that conflict. Id. at 63.
186. Id. at 58-60. See generally Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 135-36 (1810);
Magna Charta, 9 Hen. 3, c. 29 (1225); I. BRANT, JAMES MADISON, FATHER OF THE CONsTrrUTION
60 (1950); 2 J. STORY, CONSTITUrlON 547-48 (4th ed. 1873); 1 BLAcKsTONE'S COMMENTARIES
305-06 (Tucker ed. 1803).
In applying this approach to the decided cases, Professor Sax asserts that although compensation would be required in the leading airport noise decisions, regardless of overflight,
no payment would be necessary in zoning cases like Goldblatt and Consolidated Rock Products. Compare Griggs v. Allegheny County, 369 U.S. 84 (1962) (overflight, compensation required) and United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946) (overflight, compensation required)
and Batten v. United States, 306 F.2d 580 (10th Cir. 1962) (no overflight, compensation
denied), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 955 (1963), with Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S.
590 (1962) (compensation denied) and Consolidated Rock Prods. Co. v. City of Los Angeles,
57 Cal. 2d 515, 370 P.2d 342, 20 Cal. Rptr. 638, appeal dismissed, 371 U.S. 36 (1962) (compensation denied). In the airport decisions, the government has gained the right to impose
noise, smoke, and glare on the properties adjoining the airport enterprise. "[B]y virtue of its
special position the government has acquired this asset for its own account without buying
it." Sax, supra note 22, at 69. Conversely, in the zoning regulation situations, the restriction
of private property rights does not add to the resources of any governmental enterprise.
Rather, only the neighbors of the regulated property receive direct benefit. The government's
position is solely that of mediator. Id. Professor Sax states that the decision denying compensation in Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272 (1928) (cedar trees destroyed to prevent spread
of plant disease to apple orchard) was correct. However, he contends that the denials of
compensation in the railroad grade crossing cases, e.g., Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. v. Public
Util. Comm'n, 346 U.S. 346 (1953); Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry. v. Walters, 294 U.S. 405 (1935),
and in the war industry case of United States v. Central Eureka Mining Co., 357 U.S. 144
(1958) (Sax views this case as enhancement of the Government's position as supplier of war
machines), were improper. Sax, supra note 22, at 70-71. For a criticism of the Sax theory, see
Van Alstyne, supra note 27, at 21-24.
187. Sax, supra note 22, at 73. The Court apparently took this position in United States
v. Sponenbarger, 308 U.S. 256 (1939) (floodway project, compensation denied). This exception
to the Sax theory is similar to one interpretation of the "balancing" approach explained
earlier. See text accompanying note 135 supra.
188. E.g., see note 2 supra.
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facilities and services will more than offset any loss sustained in the dedication.18 9 An ordinance requiring the developer to provide reasonable sewerage
treatment facilities or connections would fit into this category. That such a
provision could, alone or in conjunction with other subdivision regulations,
require a developer to spend more on such facilities than he could possibly
recoup from the development income seems doubtful. However, if such a point
were reached, in the language of the Sax test the developer would no longer
receive benefits that "equal or exceed" the detriments imposed.i 9o
The second exception to the Sax approach denies compensation where the
government merely obtains an incidental benefit. Enhancement of the government's resource position, therefore, is in no way due to any special status accorded the sovereign. For example, if this approach had been applied in
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon'91 compensation would have been denied be-

cause the ordinance requiring subadjacent support for mining operations
benefited private lands as well as the state-owned highway. Thus, where the
government merely receives a prorata share of the general community benefits
flowing from a cleaner environment, the environmental regulations involved
would not be held to effect compensable takings.
The task of applying the full Sax theory to the context of sewer restrictions and utility requirements must be approached with care. With regard to
subdivision sewer requirements, so long as the required construction or dedication is reasonable and necessarily related to the use of the developed land,
compensation should not be required.192 In such instances, the reciprocal
benefit exception should justify denial of compensation. To be sure, the government benefits in its enterprise capacity to the extent that the subdivider
rather than the city is compelled to pay for the dedicated lands or services
provided. But the reciprocal benefit concept remains sound so long as the
developer is not required to relieve the government of potential expenses unrelated to the development of his parcel. The reciprocal benefit theory would
seem to be stretched dangerously thin, for example, if the developer were required to provide sewer lines not only for his own project but also for an
unrelated, neighboring government housing project. If environmental regulations are considered separately, so long as the property owner is able to make
some reasonable use of his land, a denial of compensation again seems necessary. For example, an ordinance prohibiting a property owner from constructing and operating his own sewage treatment facility does not benefit the government in its "participant" or enterprise capacity. 9g
189. Sax, supra note 22, at 74. See generally Heyman & Gilhool, The Constitutionality of
Imposing Increased Community Costs on New Suburban Residents Through Subdivision
Exactions, 73

YALE

L.

1119 (1964).

190. Sax, supra note 22, at 73.
191.

260 U.S. 393 (1922). For a detailed discussion of this case, see text accompanying

notes 38-43 supra.
192. See text accompanying notes 187-188 supra.
193. Admittedly, even in this instance the government may receive the benefit of being
able to utilize less expensive administration, inspection, and bulk treatment methods by
operating a single, large-scale sewage treatment facility.
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The analysis becomes more complex, however, when environmental restrictions and utility requirements are considered together. As previous examples have indicated, the result of these converging restrictions is to frustrate
development of the property. As a result, the city does not have to build
sewer lines on the affected property and therefore receives a benefit. More
importantly, the city need not expand the municipal treatment plant when
increasingly stringent environmental protection regulations make such expansion difficult and costly.
If compensation is denied in this situation, the owner of the restricted
parcel must bear an unfair share of the costs of environmental degradation by
giving up the full value of the development rights to his property. 194 Owners
of unaffected property also benefit from the restricted owner's inability to
develop his land, since expansion of the municipal sewerage plant could well
lead to increased taxes and user charges. Members of the community therefore
receive an indirect benefit analogous to that urged by Sax in the airport noise
cases.' 95 If the owner of restricted property is forced to bear the full burden,
without compensation, the taxpayers as a whole, and thereby the government
itself, benefit.
The "benefit" to the government in its enterprise capacity must be calculated with care. As suggested in the earlier discussion of cost internalization
concepts,' 96 the government should not be viewed as receiving a benefit when
the developer is merely required to internalize the sewage treatment costs associated with his parcel of land. The benefit to the government results from
forcing the developer to bear an unfair share of the social costs of poor planning and environmental degradation. As a result, the government is able to
minimize the expense of compliance with new pollution standards.
In sum, the Sax analytical framework would also require compensation in
the utility requirement-environmental regulation fact setting. As discussed
later' 97 this result is not affected by the government's claim that it has no duty

to expand the existing municipal sewer system to serve a particular landowner. In the sewer requirement context considered alone, the lack of such
obligation may be relevant. But when the government requires property
owners to utilize its sewerage facilities and then refuses to provide the necessary service, basic equitable principles should prevent the government from
relying on this premise. The government may have no legal duty to provide
parks for its citizens, but if it chooses to do so by compelling a landowner to
leave his property undeveloped, a benefit is received and compensation must
be paid. When the government seeks to extract similar public benefits through
direct or indirect means, the result should be the same.

194. The owner is not merely called upon to bear his proportionate share of environmental protection costs. See notes 175-181 supra and accompanying text. This is true whether
the share is calculated on a per capita basis or by determining the amount of environmental
harm resulting from the owner's use of his property.
195. Sax, supra note 22, at 69.
196. See notes 175-181 supra and accompanying text.
197. See notes 208-253 infra and accompanying text.
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The "Fairness"Standard
Perhaps the most theoretical approach to the compensation question has
been offered by Professor Michelman. 98 In an extensive analysis of the ethical
foundations of compensation policy, Michelman asserts that the most appropriate guidepost is the concept of "justice as fairness," as corroborated by
utilitarian social policy. 99 The Michelman thesis is far too complex to be
summarized adequately in these pages. For present purposes the important
fact is that, assuming an informed and perceptive claimant,200 a decision to
deny compensation will be "fair" if the restricted property owner "ought to
be able to appreciate how such decisions might fit into a consistent practice
which holds forth a lesser long-run risk to people like him than would any
consistent practice which is naturally suggested by the opposite decision." 2 01
In determining when such an appreciation should be present the hypothetical
claimant must consider the risks involved in various compensation patterns.
The risk that may result from liberal compensation is that settlement costs
(compensation paid plus the cost of operating the compensation framework)
may force abandonment of efficient and desirable social projects. The risk
that may accompany inadequate compensation is that the claimant will bear
such a concentrated loss that he will be unable to share effectively in the general gains from social activity.202 These two risks are minimized, thus suggesting a "fair" result, by insistence on compensation when "settlement costs are
low, when efficiency gains are dubious, and when the harm concentrated on
one individual is unusually great." 203 The risks are also minimized if the
requirement of compensation is relaxed when there are "visible reciprocities
of burden and benefit, or when burdens similar to that for which compensation is denied are concomitantly imposed on many other people." 204
198. Michelman, supra note 69. See Olsen, Role of "Fairness" in Establishing a Theory
of Taking, 3 URBAN LAv. 440 (1970); Van Alstyne, supra note 27, at 24-25.
199. Professor Michelman cautions that his essay is not designed to make a case for
utilitarian ethics. Michelman, supra note 69, at 1220.
200. The decision of whether compensation is required by "fairness" is made from the
vantage point of the disappointed claimant. Michelman assumes that such a claimant will
have the capacity "(a) to appraise his treatment and calculate his advantage over a span of
time (that is, he is not without patience) and (b) to view the particular decision in question
as a specific manifestation of a general practice which will be applied consistently to situations involving other people." Id. at 1221. These two conditions are necessary if the claimant
is to be able in some cases to decide that immediately disadvantageous treatment will be
acceptable because it is "fair."
201. Id. at 1223.
202. Id. at 1222 & n.105; Van Alstyne, supra note 27, at 24 &:n.112.
203. Michelman, supra note 69, at 1223.
204. ld. The latter situation indicates that settlement costs are high and that those
sustaining the burden are probably incurring relatively small net losses. If the losses were
not small, then the large number of affected citizens presumably would have mobilized to
deflect the burden in some way. For a discussion of Professor Sax's use of the reciprocity
theory in compensation theory, see notes 187-190 supra and accompanying text.
Although admitting that the fairness approach is difficult to apply as a practical test or
rule of decision, Michelman, supra note 69, at 1245-53, Professor Michelman states that the
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Applied to the environmental regulation-utility requirement situation, the
fairness approach requires a step-by-step analysis of the relevant criteria.
Viewed from one perspective, compensation seems necessary. The owner of
restricted land faces an unfair ° 5 economic burden resulting from his inability
to make any reasonable use of his property. The "visible reciprocities" involved in such regulation explain only a portion of the economic impact on
the owner. 20 6 Although all owners of vacant land in a given area could face a
similar burden, owners of developed or semi-developed property with existing
sewer service would receive an increased advantage. In most areas, the number
of vacant properties restricted by the convergence of utility and environmental
regulations would probably be small in comparison to the total number of
unrestricted properties. This concentration of harm suggests that the owners
adversely affected by governmental action would be unable to mobilize politically to "deflect the burden."
On the other hand, some of the fairness criteria used by Michelman suggest
that compensation need not be paid in such cases. Settlement costs could be
excessive, depending upon the number of parcels severely affected by the regulations. Moreover, any adverse impact on efficiency caused by interference
with community planning could be minimal in comparison to the economic
and administrative burdens accompanying any program of compensation or
relaxation of the regulations.
The efficiency gained by denial of relief in this context is at best dubious.
By refusing compensation or, alternatively, by continuing the restrictions in
full force, the government restricts or biases community growth in a manner
wholly unrelated to area-wide zoning and long-range community planning.
The question is not whether growth should or should not occur. The important point is that the government restrictions may work against the area's
master plan.
Although the result is by no means certain, on balance the Michelman
criteria seem to support payment of compensation in the environmental-utility
regulation context. The arguments supporting an "insistence on compensa-

concept is significantly reflected in the various judicial doctrines used to determine compensability. Id. at 1226. Although he does not support this proposition with a list of cases,
Michelman's lengthy analysis of traditional compensation doctrines indicates that his conclusion represents more than mere "academic wishful thinking." See id. at 1226-45. Cf. Thom
v. State, 376 Mich. 608, 138 N.W.2d 322, 326-27 (1965). Admittedly, Professor Michelman's
fairness standard helps to explain some of the mysterious judicial results under the more
traditional doctrines. Michelman, supra note 69, at 1226-45. Cf. Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239
U.S. 394 (1915).
205. To propose that a developer should be required to pay the reasonable costs of
providing sewer connections on his land seems fully consistent with "fairness" concepts. To
urge that all property owners must utilize their property in a manner that will protect the
environment is also sound. To demand that a developer leave his property vacant, however,
is highly questionable on fairness grounds when the practical reason for such a requirement
is to enable the government to provide an improved environment and low-cost sewage treatment to the community as a whole. See text accompanying notes 178-181 and 193-196 supra.
206. See notes 193-196 supra and accompanying text.
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tion" are strong while those supporting non-compensation are relatively weak
and uncertain. If settlement costs are high, their reduction may possibly be
affected by allowing the government to lessen restrictions in lieu of paying
compensation. This alternative need not involve the risks to the environment
attendant upon relaxation of the regulations involved. Rather, the government
could simply expand its sewerage service to include the restricted properties.
Conversely, if expansion costs exceed the total settlement costs, the government could utilize the alternatives of paying compensation or reducing the
concentrated impact of the regulations on certain landowners.
"TAKINGS" BY ABANDONMENT OR WITHHOLDING OF A GOVERNMENT SERVICE

As discussed above,20 7 the manner in which a governmental restriction of
property rights takes place may be an important factor in determining whether
a "taking" of property without just compensation has occurred. Several types
of governmental action may effectively curtail the property rights of individual
landowners. For example, the government may physically invade and destroy
the property involved. Alternatively, the government can enact regulations
that require a property owner to use or not to use his land in a particular
manner. Finally, the government may change or withhold an existing municipal benefit, such as highway access or sewer service.
The first two types of action have been discussed previously. The remaining type of action, withholding a municipal service, is an integral part of the
environmental regulation-utility restriction fact setting used in this article. A
municipality's refusal to supply public sewer service to a developer's property
may be an important factor in preventing the land from having any reasonable
use. If the compensation cases involving physical invasions and regulatory
restrictions of property are to be applied to the environmental regulationutility requirement context, any analytical differences in the "withheld benefit" cases must be overcome.
The decisions involving a withheld governmental benefit fall into two
general fact settings: the discontinuance of roads and the abandonment of
other types of public works and projects. The highway cases sometimes result
in a finding that a compensable taking has occurred. The decisions dealing
with other types of public works, however, usually hold that no taking of
property has been effectuated. For present purposes, the question is whether
the restrictions upon land use resulting from an owner's inability to gain sewer
service more closely resemble the first or second line of decisions.
Discontinuanceof Streets and Highways
Although abandonment of a road may in fact damage adjoining or abutting
land, such action does not necessarily constitute a "taking" of property in the

207. See notes 28-91 supra and accompanying text.
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constitutional sense.2 08 When the fee of a street is in the public, an adjoining
owner will generally suffer only incidental or consequential injury if the road
grade is changed 209 or the street is abandoned. 210 The result, however, is different if the governmental action destroys "all reasonable access" to the property. Thus, if the government destroys access by changing a local connector
road into a limited-access highway,211 if the closing of a street deprives a property owner of all reasonable access to her land, 212 or if a road is abandoned due
213
to construction of a new highway that does not serve the affected property,
then a compensable taking will be found. Although statutory provisions in
some jurisdictions may authorize compensation, 2 4 mere deprivation of some
access routes is not a "taking."2 15 Even if the only public way on which a parcel
abuts is discontinued, compensation may be denied if the owner is also the
216
owner of the fee of the discontinued way.
Two aspects of the highway line of decisions deserve special consideration.
The first is whether the finding of a taking depends solely upon the loss of an
"easement" to the land. The second is the importance of governmental discretion in designing and allocating municipal improvements.
In some cases, the finding of a compensable taking seems to turn on the
destruction or removal of the property owner's easement of access rather than
his resulting inability to utilize the property for "any reasonable use."217 For
208. 2 P. NIcHoLs, supra note 15, §6.32(2).
209. Bowden v. City of Jacksonville, 52 Fla. 216, 42 So. 394 (1906). But cf. Kendry v.
State Rd. Dep't, 213 So. 2d 23 (4th D.C.A. Fla. 1968), cert. denied, 222 So. 2d 752 (Fla. 1969).
210. See 2 P. NicHoLs, supra note 15, §6.32(2).
211. Id. See, e.g., Benerofe v. State Rd. Dep't, 217 So. 2d 838 (Fla. 1969) (limited access
highway); Anhoco Corp. v. Dade County, 144 So. 2d 793 (Fla. 1962) (land service road converted into limited-access facility); State Road Dep't v. McCaffrey, 229 So. 2d 668 (2d D.C.A.
Fla. 1969) (limited access highway); Jordan v. Town of Canton, 265 A.2d 96 (Me. 1970) (town
road classified as "limited-user highway"). See generally Note, Substantial Impairment: A
Standard of Recovery for Deprivation of Access, 22 BAYLOR L. Rav. 404 (1970).
212. E.g., Standiford Civic Club v. Commonwealth, 289 S.W.2d 498, 500 (Ky. 1956); State
Highway Comm'n v. Phillips, 267 N.C. 379, 148 S.E.2d 282 (1966).
213. Ex parte Commonwealth Dep't of Highways, 291 S.W.2d 814 (Ky. 1956); cf. Boney
v. State Dep't of Transp., 250 So. 2d 650 (1st D.C.A. Fla. 1971).
214. See Anhoco Corp. v. Dade County, 144 So. 2d 793 (Fla. 1962); Grove v. Allen, 92
Iowa 519, 61 N.W. 175 (1894); DeMoss v. Police Jury of Bossier Parish, 167 La. 83, 118 So
700 (1928); Grand River Dam Authority v. Misenhimer, 195 Okla. 682, 161 P.2d 757 (1945);
Heil County v. Allegheny County, 330 Pa. 449, 199 A. 341 (1938).
215. E.g., Wright v. Flood, 304 Ky. 122, 200 S.W.2d 117, 119 (1947); State Dep't of Roads
v. Nickol Grain Co., 182 Neb. 191, 153 N.W.2d 727 (1967); Fougeron v. Seward County, 174
Neb. 753, 119 N.W.2d 298, 303-04 (1963).
216. See Southern Ry. v. Albes, 153 Ala. 523, 45 So. 234 (1907) (compensation denied
even though constitution allowed compensation for damagings); Kimball v. Homan, 74 Mich.
699, 42 N.W. 167 (1889); Commonwealth v. Hession, 430 Pa. 273, 242 A.2d 432 (1968), cert.
denied, 593 U.S. 1049 (1969); In re Appropriations of Land of Mitchell, 209 Pa. Super. 288,
228 A.2d 53, 56 (1967) (mere "consequential damage"); Cherry Hill v. Fewell, 48 S.C. 553, 26
S.E. 798, 801 (1897). But cf. Boney v. State Dep't of Transportation, 250 So. 2d 650 (1st
D.C.A. Fla. 1971) (allowing compensation for deprivation of some right of access, possibly
due to statutory requirements); Mississippi State Highway Comm'n v. Myers, 184 So. 2d 409
(Miss. 1966) (special damages awarded).
217. E.g., Schiefelbein v. United States, 124 F.2d 915, 947 (8th Cir. 1942); Standiford
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example, in Schiefelbein v. United States21 8 the United States Court of Appeals
for the Eighth Circuit stated: "The property taken and for which compensation is payable is not the land to which access is cut off but the private property of the condemnee in the public highway." 219 Whether an owner of property has a similar easement for water and sewer service is questionable. The
important point, however, is that viewing highway abandonment cases in
terms of easement loss is conceptually improper.
Several reasons suggest that such an approach is overly narrow under contemporary compensation theories. First, loss of access to a single roadway is
seldom held to be a "taking" in the constitutional sense. 220 Yet in such instances the easement to the abandoned road is wholly destroyed. If the easement concept is to be meshed with the general rule that a taking occurs only
if the abandonment removes "all reasonable access" to the property, the term
"easement" must be stretched to include not just one, but "all reasonable access" routes to the land. Second, cloaking a determination in terms of the loss
of some neatly-packaged property right (for example, an easement) is distressingly similar to saying that a constitutional taking does not occur unless some
221
clearly-defined property is invaded or destroyed. Yet, as discussed earlier,
physical invasion is no longer required under contemporary judicial doctrines.
Third, as admitted in Schiefelbein, the value of the easement allegedly taken
by the highway closing."cannot be ascertained without reference to the dom222
inant estate to which it was attached."
These factors indicate that the effect of governmental action in road
abandonment controversies should be judged on the same terms as in other
taking cases. The crucial factor is not whether some easement is lost, but
whether the abandonment of the road deprives the owner of "all reasonable
use" of his property. Although admittedly open to various interpretations,223
this standard appropriately distinguishes between the cases in which all reasonable access is denied and those in which only some access routes are blocked.
In the first line of decisions, loss of all practical access routes deprives the
owner of all reasonable use of the property. In the second, inconvenience or
economic damage may result, but the governmental action does not prevent
"any reasonable use" of the land.
The second important factor in the highway cases is the effect of governmental discretion. Although this concept is emphasized more frequently in the
decisions dealing with abandonment of other types of public works,224 the

Civic Club v. Commonwealth, 289 S.W.2d 498, 500 (Ky. 1956); Jordan v. Town of Canton,
265 A.2d 96 (Me. 1970).
218. 124 F.2d 945 (8th Cir. 1942).

219. Id. at 947.
220. See
221. See
28-91 supra.
222. 124
228. See
THAT

cases cited notes 214-216 supra.
the discussion of the physical invasion standard in text accompanying notes

F.2d at 947.
the compensation theories discussed following subheading GOVE-NMNrAL ACrION
EFFEcTS A TArING OF PROPERTY: USEFUL THaouas, supra.

224. See notes 232-253 infra and accompanying text.
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older highway abandonment cases occasionally state that the removal of a
road cannot be a compensable taking because the government has discretion
to determine the location and extent of public highways.2 25 Legislative judgment concerning such matters is ordinarily conclusive unless "the action is so
unreasonable, arbitrary, and oppressive as to render it void." 22 6
That governmental action which deprives an owner of all reasonable use
of her property should be held so "unreasonable, arbitrary, and oppressive"
7
should not be surprising. The Kentucky court of appeals has taken this view.22
Noting that authority for the exercise of governmental discretion in closing
roads derives from the concept of "public convenience and necessity," the court
nevertheless refused to allow this discretion to be exercised in a manner that
effected a taking of property without due process of law. 228 The Utah supreme
court has announced a similar approach. Quoting from the McQuillin treatise
in Davidson v. Salt Lake City2 29 that court admitted that the "propriety, advisability, necessity, extent, and character of public improvements is vested in
2
the discretion of the municipal authorities." But the court cautioned: 30
The law is well settled that where bad faith, fraud or corruption appear, or manifest oppression or gross abuse is shown, for example, unreasonable interference with private property rights, or where the action
is unlawfully in violation of mandatory legal provisions designed to
safeguard private property rights, the power of the courts may be invoked by appropriate action.
These statements suggest what other courts have apparently taken for
granted: an allegation of governmental discretion will not prevent finding a
compensable taking.231 The government must have discretion to abandon highways, lest the country be paved with concrete. But the decision to close a street,
like all government decisions, must not be so arbitrary or oppressive as to
violate constitutional provisions designed to protect the people. If the abandonment of a highway removes all reasonable access to a parcel of land, a taking of

225. E.g., Arkansas Valley & W.R.R. v. Bullen, 31 Okla. 36, 119 P. 414 (1911); see Con
Realty Co. v. Ellerstein, 125 N.J.L. 196, 14 A.2d 544, 546 (1940); 2 P. NIcHoLS, supra note 15,
§6.32(2).
226. Lyddy v. City of Rock Island, 45 Il1. App. 2d 76, 194 N.E.2d 647, 652 (1963).
227. Standiford Civic Club v. Commonwealth, 289 S.W.2d 498 (Ky. 1956).
228. Id. at 500.
229. 81 Utah 203, 17 P.2d 234, 237 (1932). See 10 E. McQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL CoRPoRaTIoNs
§30.31 (3d ed. 1966).
230. 81 Utah at 209, 17 P.2d at 237.
231. A similar result is generally reached with regard to sovereign immunity. See United
States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196 (1882); Thom v. State, 376 Mich. 608, 138 N.W.2d 322 (1965). See
generally Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682 (1949) (federal officer); Great Northern Life Ins. Co. v. Read, 322 U.S. 47 (1944) (state officer); Ex parte Young,
209 U.S. 123 (1908) (state officer). For discussions of the use of the abstention doctrine by
federal courts faced with the task of interpreting state eminent domain provisions, compare
County of Allegheny v. Mashuda Co., 360 U.S. 185 (1959), with Louisiana Power & Light Co.
v. City of Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25 (1969). Cf. Madisonville Tractor Co. v. St. Bernard Mining
Co., 196 U.S. 239, 257 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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property occurs. Under contemporary approaches to inverse condemnation,
the "property" taken is not the "easement of access" but rather the "right"
to use the subject land for some reasonable purpose. Unless some use can be
made, the owner effectively owns nothing - other than the questionable right
to pay real estate taxes on his property.

Abandonment of Other Government Projects
Generally, case law suggests that "[a]n owner of land has no private rights
in the continued existence of any public work upon or near his land other
than a highway."232 Reichelderfer v. Quinn233 offers one example of this approach. Reichelderfer had attempted to enjoin the District of Columbia Commissioners from building a fire station in the public park adjoining his property. Assuming that the construction would divert the use of the public land
from park purposes 23 4 and admitting that the park enhanced the value of
plaintiff's property, the United States Supreme Court quashed the injunction
issued below. Compensation need not be paid, the Court explained, when the
value is "both created and diminished as an incident of the operations of the
government."23 5 If the enjoyment of a benefit derived from the public acts of
government "were a source of legal rights to have it perpetuated," the mere
exercise of governmental powers would be self-defeating.236 The Quinn approach is also found in earlier state and federal cases. Hence no action has
been held to lie when a state capitol is moved away, 237 when water pipes in

the street are relocated, 23 8 or a canal 239 or railroad 24o is discontinued, provided
the change is made by authority of law.
Some of these decisions, and perhaps Quinn, can be explained on the
ground that the complainant only suffered "incidental damages" rather than a
"taking" of property.2 41 To this extent, the cases are consistent with the highway decisions involving grade changes or partial loss of access. Three public
works decisions, however, deserve deeper analysis.
42
In Fox v. Cincinnati,2
the Ohio Board of Public Works leased the surplus
water in the state's canals for hydraulic purposes, reserving the right to resume
use of the water, if it should be needed for navigation. A statute was sub-

232. 2 P. NicHoLs, supra note 15, §6.32(3).
233. 287 US. 315 (1932) (Stone, J.). See Caldwell v. City of Seattle, 75 Wash. 565, 135 P.
470 (1913) (construction of public sewer damaged public park).
234. The court distinguished the public trust doctrine issue. 287 U.S. at 320 & n.3.
235. Id. at 319.
236. Id.
237. Edwards v. Lesueur, 132 Mo. 410, 415, 33 S.W. 1130, 1135 (1896).
238. Asher v. Hutchinson Water, Light & Power Co., 66 Kan. 469, 71 P. 813 (1903).
239. Kirk v. Maumee Valley Elec. Co., 279 U.S. 797 (1929); Fox v. Cincinnati, 104 U.S.
783 (1881).
240. Bryan v. Louisville & N.R.R., 244 F. 650 (8th Cir. 1917), appeal dismissed, cert.
denied, 246 US. 651 (1918).
241. See notes 72-73 supra and accompanying text.
242. 104 U.S. 783 (1881).
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sequently passed granting a portion of one canal to a city for use as a highway.
Plaintiff claimed that the resulting loss of his leased hydraulic power was a
taking of property without due process of law. The United States Supreme
Court held that no deprivation of property had occurred. Three factors apparently influenced this result. First, the principal object of the canal was
navigation; thus, the state could not be expected to keep up the canal regardless of cost solely to meet its water requirement leases. Second, if the water
had been diverted to navigational needs, the state's only duty would have been
to forego further collection of rents; abandonment of the canal for another
reason should not have created a different result. Finally, plaintiff leased the
water power with full knowledge of possible future diversion.
Virtually the same fact situation arose some fifty years after Fox in Kirk v.
Maumee Valley Electric Co. 24 3 Appellee electric company unsuccessfully

claimed that abandonment of the water leases impaired the obligation of the
lease contracts and deprived the company of property without due process of
law. Relying heavily upon Fox, the Kirk opinion focused on the "nature and
extent" of the company's right to withdraw water from the canal. The proper
construction of the leases, the Court said, was that "they imposed no obligation on the state to maintain the canal either for navigation or other purposes
and when abandoned by the state the rights of lessees to surplus water
ceased."

244

In one respect the canal cases are similar to a situation in which the government ceases to provide municipal sewer service to certain property. Under
the common assumption that the government has no legal duty to provide such
service, 245 the municipality could allege that the "contracts" impliedly provide
for discontinuance of service following reasonable notice. On the other hand,
several distinctions between the canal cases and the sewer situation can be
made. First, the water leases in Fox and Kirk were only incidental to the operation of the canal, while the provision of sewer service is itself the principal
purpose 24 6 of the governmental operation. Second, the property allegedly taken
243. 279 U.S. 797 (1929).
244. Id. at 803 (emphasis added). The Court relied on the consistent interpretations of
the leases by the Ohio courts: Vought v. Columbus, Hocking Valley & Athens R.R., 58 Ohio
St. 123, 50 N.E. 442 (1898); Elevator Co. v. Cincinnati, 30 Ohio St. 629 (1876); Hubbard
v. City of Toledo, 21 Ohio St. 379 (1871).
245. See Lyddy v. City of Rock Island, 45 II. App. 2d 76, 194 N.E.2d 647, 651-52 (1963);
Tott v. Sioux City, 261 Iowa 677, 155 N.W.2d 502, 505, 506 (1968) (citing cases); Lace v.
City of Oskaloosa, 143 Iowa 704, 121 N.W. 542, 544 (1909); Davidson v. Salt Lake City, 81
Utah 203, 17 P.2d 234, 237 (1932). But see Bowers v. Machir, 191 S.W. 758 (Tex. Ct. Civ. App.
1916); Dwyer v. Hosea, I Posey Unrep. Cases 596 (Tex. 1880); City of Norfolk v. Norfolk
County Water Co., 113 Va. 303, 74 S.E. 226 (1912). But cf. Taylor v. Wentz, 15 In. 2d 83,
153 N.E.2d 812 (1958); Corey v. Commissioners of Highways, 158 IIl. 197, 41 N.E. 1105 (1895);
Lyddy v. City of Rock Island, 45 Ill. App. 2d 76, 194 N.E.2d 647, 652 (1963); St. Louis County
v. State Highway Comm'n, 409 S.W.2d 149 (Mo. 1966). See generally Hawkins v. Town of
Shaw, 437 F.2d 1286 (5th Cir. 1971) (denial of equal protection); Garvin v. Barker, 59 So. 2d
360, 364 (Fla. 1952); Chardkoff Junk Co. v. City of Tampa, 102 Fla. 501, 135 So. 457 (1931).
246. Admittedly, an argument might be made that sewer service is merely "incidental"
to the principal municipal business of supplying water. Cf. State v. City of Miami, 157 Fla.
726, 740, 27 So. 2d 118, 126 (1946).
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in the canal cases was hydraulic water power, not the properties on which the
power was utilized. No allegation was made that denial of the water power
prevented "any reasonable use" of the properties served by the canal water.
In the sewer example, however, the taking of property is not the loss of municipal sewage treatment, but the inability of the owner to make "any reasonable use" of his property without such service.
More difficult to explain is the Kansas case of Asher v. Hutchinson Water,
Light & Power Co. 247 In that action, plaintiff unsuccessfully attempted to enjoin the power company from removing a water main supplying plaintiff's
stockyards. The company supplied water to the city under a contract enacted
by municipal ordinance. Exercising its contractual right to designate the areas
to be served, the city council passed a resolution approving the removal and
relocation of the water mains leading to plaintiff's property. The Kansas
supreme court affirmed denial of the injunction warning that the courts have
no right to interfere with the "political power" and municipal "discretion"
involved in the operation of public utilities. The court asserted: "An individual can acquire no vested right as against the public in the continued service of a public utility. Such a doctrine, once admitted, would destroy the convenience as a public utility."248 The court recognized that by its action plaintiff's property would be rendered practically valueless for the purposes for
which it was improved and for its existing use.2 49 Nevertheless, the defendant
had alleged that the business at the stockyards was "very inconsiderable" and
that water could be supplied to the property "by means of a gas engine at a
cost not to exceed $500." 250 Thus, although Asher expresses broad principles
concerning governmental discretion in the provision of municipal services, the
decision does not deal with discontinuance of a municipal benefit depriving
the property owner of "all reasonable use" of his land. Moreover, as the earlier
discussion of highway abandonment cases indicated,251 municipal discretion
in removing public works may not control the question of whether a taking of
property has occurred. So far as the removal of an existing governmental
service is concerned, a compensable taking should be found when governmental
action prevents the property owner from making any reasonable use of his
land.
If discretion is not a defense when a governmental service is discontinued
or abandoned, the same result should be mandated where the government fails
to provide the service to some segments of the citizenry. Because administrative
action and decisionmaking can occur by inaction as well as by action, the
crucial compensation question should be the effect of the given government
decision, not the manner in which it is made.252 Recognition of this uniform
247. 66 Kan. 496, 71 P. 813 (1903).
248. Id. at 500, 71 P. at 814.
249. Id. at 497-98, 71 P. at 813. Reference should also be made to the syllabus by the
court.
250. Id. at 498, 71 P. at 814.
251. See notes 208-231 supra and accompanying text.
252. See discussion of the physical invasion approach in the text accompanying notes
28-91 supra.
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approach would neither alter existing precedent nor bankrupt government
treasuries. Governmental refusal to supply or continue municipal services
seldom frustrates "any reasonable use" of property, although the exact mean53
ing of those words is unclear.2
In the sanitary sewer example, whether a refusal to initially supply or
continue municipal service constitutes a taking would depend on such factors
as whether alternate means of waste water disposal were available and whether
existing zoning would allow reasonable property uses that would not produce
sewage effluent. Only in unusual situations would the government's failure to
provide sewer service amount to a denial of all reasonable use of the land. In
most cases some practical use of the land could be made, notwithstanding the
unavailability of municipal sewer service, because either: (a) private sewage
companies serve the area, (b) individual waste water disposal methods are
authorized, or (c) existing zoning allows reasonable land uses that do not require sewer connections. If combined government action prevents the property
from being put to "any reasonable use," the government has several methods
of alleviating the economic impact on the landowner. It may extend municipal
sewer service to the land, allow private sewage treatment companies to serve
the property, authorize the landowner to install his own waste water control
apparatus, change the existing zoning to allow some economically-feasible use
of the land which does not produce sewage effluent, or pay just compensation
to the landowner.
In sum, the cases involving a withheld government benefit do not appreciably alter the "taking" theories enunciated earlier. Once governmental
actions combine to prevent an owner from making any reasonable use of his
property, the manner in which the government inflicts these restrictions should
not be decisive.
ASSESSING RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE TAKING: WHO SHOULD "PAY"?

The question of which governmental entity should be required to alleviate
restrictions that effect a taking of property is often simple. Where a single
government requires use of its sewage disposal system, refuses to allow extension of that system to a claimant's property, and also zones the subject parcel
in such a manner that any reasonable use of the land requires a sewage disposal method, then that government alone should be held responsible for the
taking. Even if the responsible local government feels that one or more of its
regulations was passed in response to more stringent state and federal environmental standards, the landowner should not be forced to join these latter
parties in his request for relief. The task of gaining any needed assistance for
the local government should not fall to the owner whose property is taken.
Rather, equalization of the financial and administrative burdens among the

253.

See the various theories developed following subheading

GOVERNMENTAL

ACTION

THAT EFFECTS A TAKING OF PROPERTY: USEFUL THEORIES, supra.
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several levels of government should be effectuated through intergovernmental
negotiations and the general political process.
In some instances, however, no single government can be held fully responsible for the owner's inability to put his property to any reasonable use.
For example, the county may refuse to extend sewer service to the subject
property and zone the property such that any reasonable use of the land would
necessitate sewage disposal facilities. Although the county may allow individual "package plant" treatment operations on the property, state environmental regulations could prohibit such operations in the given location. The
result of these combined restrictions would be dear: the owner could make
no reasonable use of his land. The question is two-fold: First, should both
governments be allowed to avoid responsibility because either action, taken
alone, effects a taking of property? Second, if the landowner is to receive relief
from the combined effect of the regulations, what formula should be used in
allocating governmental responsibility?
Existence of GovernmentalResponsibility for Takings Effected by Actions
of Two Government Entities
As a general principle, two levels of government should not be able to avoid
responsibility for a taking of property merely because neither of their actions,
considered individually, would unconstitutionally infringe upon private property rights. Several factors support this position. First, if the prohibition
against takings is designed to prevent arbitrary governmental action,254 the
broad legal context in which a governmental decision is made is relevant to
any determination of arbitrariness. Government decisions are not produced
in a vacuum. Existing laws at other levels, just as much as growth patterns
and economic statistics, 255 are important considerations in the decisionmaking
process. The multi-level nature of our political process requires that each government entity frame its decisions with due regard for conflicting laws and
regulations of other jurisdictions. An analogous theory is applied in some tort
cases where the actions of two or more defendants combine to interfere with
an owner's use and enjoyment of his property. Both defendants are held liable
for some portion of the damage even though the conduct of a single defendant
would not support a judgment. The opinion of the Maryland court of appeals
in an early nuisance case, Woodyear v. Schaefer, offers one example of this
258
concept:
The extent to which the appellee has contributed to the nuisance
may be slight and scarcely appreciable. Standing alone, it might well
be that it would only, very slightly, if at all, prove a source of annoyance. And so it might be, as to each of the other numerous persons contributing to the nuisance. Each standing alone, might amount to little
254. This is the view taken by Professor Sax. See note 22 supra and accompanying text.
255. See the Florida "changed circumstances" zoning cases cited note 90 supra and text
accompanying notes 85-91 supra.
256. 57 Md. 1, 10 (1881). See Katz, supra note 7, at 618 n.66.
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or nothing. But it is when all are united together, and contribute to a
common result, that they become important as factors, in producing
the mischief complained of ... [E]ach element of contributive injury
is a part of one common whole, and to stop the mischief of the whole,
each part in detail must be arrested and removed.
Commentators and other courts have applied this reasoning 25. in cases involving pollution,25s flooding of land, 259 diversion of water, 260 obstruction of
a highway, 261 and noise nuisance.262 The basis for the approach is that the
standard of conduct applicable to each defendant is governed by all existing
circumstances, including the activities of other defendants. "Pollution of a
stream to even a slight extent becomes unreasonable when similar pollution
by others makes the condition of the stream approach the danger point. The
263
single act itself becomes wrongful because of what others are doing."
Even if both levels of government should not be held jointly or severally
liable, the "final actor" should be held responsible for adding its regulatory
scheme "on top of" the existing legal restrictions. Thus, the regulatory framework passed by "prior actors" forms merely part of the over-all framework in
which the reasonableness of the final actor's conduct must be judged. In effect,
the only contributing cause of the taking of property is the restrictive measure
passed by the "final actor." Even under this approach, however, the legal responsibility might fall to a prior actor if the final actor were a superior level
of government.
A second reason for requiring compensation in the dual-level taking situation is that constitutional prohibitions against uncompensated takings of
property are not phrased in terms of separate levels of government. Rather,
as the Florida constitution demonstrates, the broad concern is that "[n]o
private property" be taken for a "public" purpose without compensation.264
If the compensation standard applied turns upon the owner's inability to make
any reasonable use of his property, the source of the governmental restriction
should not be a critical factor. Whether phrased in terms of diminution of
value,2 65 loss on investment, 266 or destruction of all reasonable use, 2 7 the key

257. See W. PROSSER, ToRTs 322-23 (4th ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as W. PRossER].
258. Warren v. Parkhurst, 45 Misc. 466, 92 N.Y.S. 725 (1904); Northup v. Eakes, 72 Okla.
66, 178 P. 266 (1918).
259. Woodland v. Portneuf Marsh Valley Irrigation Co., 26 Idaho 789, 146 P. 1106 (1915);
Sloggy v. Dilworth, 38 Minn. 179, 36 N.W. 451 (1888); Town of Sharon v. Anahna Realty
Corp., 97 Vt. 336, 123 A. 192 (1924).
260. Hillman v. Newington, 57 Cal. 56 (1880).
261. Sadler v. Great Western R.R., [1895] 2 Q.B. 688.
262. Lambton v. Mellish, [1894] 3 Ch. 163.
263. W. PROSSER, supra note 257, at 323. As Professor Prosser indicates, assessment of
liability under this theory is a separate question from the allocation of responsibility among
the culpable parties. For an example of apportionment of damages in this situation, see
Sloggy v. Dilworth, 38 Minn. 179, 36 N.W. 451 (1888).
264. See note 18 supra.
265. See notes 92-101 supra and accompanying text.
266. See notes 102-129 supra and accompanying text.
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criterion under this approach is the effect of the government actions. If "fairness"2 68 is the test, compensation from one or both participating governments
seems required. Although application of the fairness thesis is often difficult,
that Michelman's hypothetical claimant would consider an otherwise compensable restriction "fair" solely because of its dual components seems doubtful.
The argument in favor of compensation is somewhat more complex when
the theories involving a determination of government benefit are considered.
The difficult question is whether the "benefit" involved is measured in terms
of any general social gain or in terms of benefit to a specific level of government. The balancing approach 269 offers one example. The weighing process
could be applied separately at each level of government, thereby defeating
recovery or, alternatively, the total "public" benefit could be balanced against
the cumulative private harm incurred from all government actions. The latter
approach seems favorable, both in terms of constitutional construction and
fairness.
If the Dunham distinction between harm prevention and benefit extraction270 is utilized, a similar problem arises. Again, the "public" benefit seems
to be the crucial consideration. If the taking occurs as a result of actions by
the county and the city, that only the city receives a clear benefit may be
relevant in determining financial responsibility. This should not, however,
prevent the landowner from recovering from someone, because the "public"
has extracted a benefit.
Finally, under the Sax distinction between enterprise benefit and arbitral
function,271 compensation is still warranted. Allocating responsibility for a
taking among two or more levels of government need not conflict with the
"enterprise" concept. Any benefit involved can accrue to two governments as
well as one. If only one government clearly benefits from the property restriction, then the action of that government may itself be a taking of property
when viewed under the "broad legal context" approach. Analyzed under the
Sax standard, the dual-level taking problem seems more easily explained in
terms of enterprise benefit than in terms of arbitral function. To the extent
that an arbitral role is present at all, the conflict resolution involves government entities as well as private economic interests.
In sum, a claimant's right to relief should not be destroyed merely because
a taking results from the actions of two or more government entities. Determining how economic and administrative responsibility for the taking should be
allocated, however, is a more difficult endeavor.

267.
268.
269.
270.
271.

See notes 71-91,141-152 supra and accompanying text.
See notes 198-206 supra and accompanying text.
See notes 130-156 supra and accompanying text.
See notes 157-181 supra and accompanying text.
See notes 182-191 supra and accompanying text.
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Allocation of Financialand Administrative Responsibility for a Taking
of Property by Two or More Government Entities
The allocation of responsibility for a multi-level governmental taking of
property has received little treatment by the commentators. Although some
case law exists concerning the entities liable in eminent domain and inverse
condemnation actions, a single level of government is usually held liable..2 72
Using the concepts suggested in these decisions in conjunction with tort theories dealing with apportionment of damages, the following pages develop several apportionment approaches which may be useful in the present context. In
general, the outlined theories are not intended to provide definitive answers
in this embryonic area. Rather, the concepts are offered to stimulate future
thought and research.
Cooperative Effort. Where the taking of property results from a cooperative
effort by two or more levels of government, each entity should be held jointly
and severally liable for the encroachment upon private property rights. This
result seems logical even where the actual taking of property is "caused" by
the action of a single government body.
The Florida supreme court has applied this approach in a case involving
the construction of a limited access highway by Dade County, the State Road
23
Department, and the Turnpike Authority. In Anhoco Corp. v. Dade County,
the taking involved the property owner's temporary loss of access before his
land was properly condemned. The county had agreed to obtain the right-ofway and convey it to the Road Department. In an earlier decision 27 4 the supreme court had enjoined the three governments from interfering with
Anhoco's access rights until the fee had been properly condemned. In the
instant decision the court held the county jointly and severally liable for the
temporary loss of access.

2

7

5

In contrast to decisions in which a single government is found responsible
for the taking,2 7 6 Anhoco offers certain advantages to the property owner. By
claiming joint and several liability, the owner need not face the problem of
proving which government was "responsible for" or maintained "control" over
the development project involved. 2 77 Moreover, if compensation is sought, the

272. E.g., Corbett v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 166 So. 2d 196 (1st D.C.A. Fla. 1964);
Petrovich v. State, 181 So. 2d 811 (La. Ct. App. 1966); Vuljan v. Board of Comm'rs, 170 So.
2d 910 (La. Ct. App. 1965); Bower v. City of Columbus, 27 Ohio St. 2d 7, 271 N.E.2d 860
(1971). It is not suggested that multiple liability was necessarily mandated in these cases.
273. 144 So. 2d 793 (Fla. 1962).
274. Florida State Turnpike Authority v. Anhoco Corp., 116 So. 2d 8 (Fla. 1959).
275. 144 So. 2d at 796-97. For a discussion of the related tort doctrine requiring joint
and several liability for persons acting "in concert," see W. PROSSFR, supra note 257, at 314-15.
"In legal contemplation, there is a joint enterprise, and a mutual agency, so that the act of
one is the act of all, and liability for all that is done must be visited upon each." Id. at 315.
276. See note 272 supra.
277. See, e.g., Corbett v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 166 So. 2d 196 (1st D.C.A. Fla. 1964);
Van Szyman v. Town of Auburn, 345 Mass. 444, 188 N.E.2d 453, 457 (1963); Schesch v. Peo-
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plaintiff's ability to levy judgment claims against several government entities
may increase the chances of speedy recovery. Finally, if relief from the regulatory scheme is requested, joint and several responsibility increases the chance
that a comprehensive change in the multi-level regulatory structure will be
accomplished with minimal economic and temporal burden on the claimant.
Whether the requisite "cooperative effort" can be shown in the environmental regulation-utility restriction context is questionable. Where local regulations are required to be formulated as part of a state legislative enactment
such a showing may be possible. For example, if a state environmental protecdon act directly requires local governments to refuse to accept new sewer system tap-ins and the state itself limits the operation of individual sewage treatment facilities, the requisite "cooperative effort" might be found. On the
other hand, a claimant would probably fail if the state merely required municipal sewage operations to produce a higher grade of effluent. In this instance, the local government may have freely chosen to limit tap-ins rather
than improve sewage treatment.
Joint Liability for Violation of a Common Duty. Joint liability may still be
imposed if two governmental entities have a "common duty" not to take
claimant's property without payment of just compensation278 As the prior
discussion of contributing causation suggests, 279 such a "common duty" may be
imposed by holding that the actions of each government entity should be
judged by considering existing laws in other jurisdictions. Once the regulations
of two or more governments combine to effect a taking, both become liable
for failing to take action preserving the owner's property rights. Both governments are then under a similar duty to prevent a particular occurrence. This
view is supported in tort theory,280 for example, where two or more defendants
are under an obligation to maintain a party wall,281 railroad track, 28 2 or high28 3
way.

pIe, 65 Misc. 2d 44, 316 N.Y.S.2d 862 (Sup. Ct. 1970). For examples of statutory allocation,
see Department of Highways v. Alexander, 388 S.W.2d 599 (Ky. Ct. App. 1965); Department
of Highways v. Thacker, 384 S.W.2d 79 (Ky. Ct. App. 1964); City of Charleston v. Alley, 210
Tenn. 211, 357 S.W.2d 339 (1962).
Unfortunately, a test based on a government's "control over" or "responsibility for" a
particular project is not helpful in the regulatory-restriction multiple-level taking situation.
278. See W. PROSSER, supra note 257, at 315. Cf. Johnson v. Chapman, 43 W. Va. 639, 28

S.E. 744 (1897).
279. See text accompanying note 254 supra.
280. IV. PROSsER, supra note 257, at 315.
281. Simmons v. Everson, 124 N.Y. 319, 26 N.E. 911 (1891); Klauder v. McGrath, 35 Pa.
128 (1860); Johnson v. Chapman, 43 W. Va. 639, 28 S.E. 744 (1897).
282. Schaffer v. Pennsylvania R.R., 101 F.2d 369 (7th Cir. 1939); Wisconsin Cent. R.R. v.
Ross, 142 Ill. 9, 31 N.E. 412 (1892); Lindsay v. Acme Plaster Co., 220 Mich. 367, 190 N.W.

275 (1922).
283. Doeg v. Cook, 126 Cal. 213, 58 P. 707 (1899); cf. Walton, Witten &cGraham v.
Miller's Adm'x, 109 Va. 210, 63 SM. 458 (1909).
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Single Indivisible Result. Another theory imposing joint and several liability is found in a line of tort cases involving a "single indivisible result."
Professor Prosser states the general rule as follows: "Where two or more causes
combine to produce such a single result, incapable of any logical division, each
may be a substantial factor in bringing about the loss, and if so, each must be
charged with all of it."284
The basis for joint liability is a recognition that
certain results, by their very nature, are incapable of any logical, reasonable, or
practical division. Although only culpable causes are held jointly responsible, 28 5
the theory is applied where either cause would have been sufficient in itself to
bring about the result.2 6 The same doctrine, moreover, is used where both
causes are essential to the injury.287
In the tort field, single indivisible results have been found in cases involving deaths, 2SS single wounds, 28 9 merging fires that burn a building,-9 and
colliding vehicles that injure a third person. 291 The theory seems equally applicable in the dual-level taking situation so long as both government entities
can be held "culpable" for the destruction of property rights. The necessary
responsibility should be present if each level of government can be held to
act with notice of the interacting rules and laws imposed by the others.- 2
Once an owner is denied any reasonable use of his property, apportionment
of liability for the continuing loss would seem difficult, if not impossible.
Single Level Liability. If joint liability is rejected, the landowner can still
assert that one of the two government entities imposing the restrictions should
be held responsible. At least three theories are available.
A "final actor responsibility" approach 293 would place liability on the government whose action increases the total restrictions on a claimant's property
to the level necessary for a taking to occur. The restriction passed by the final
actor would be the cause of the taking; earlier regulations on land use would

284. W. PROSSER, supra note 257, at 315-16.
285. Id. at 316 & n.40.
286. See note 290 infra.
287. E.g., Washington & Georgetown R.R. v. Hickey, 166 U.S. 521 (1897) (horse car
driven onto railway tracks with negligent operation of crossing gates); Barnes v. Masterson,
38 App. Div. 612, 56 N.Y.S. 939 (2d Dep't 1899) (defendants successively piled sand against
plaintiff's wall, causing it to collapse); Ramsey v. Carolina-Tennessee Power Co., 195 N.C.
788, 143 S.E. 861 (1928) (railway shunting cars, which struck negligently maintained light
pole).
288. Hackworth v. Davis, 87 Idaho 98, 390 P.2d 422 (1964); Bolick v. Gallagher, 268 Wis.
421, 67 N.W.2d 860 (1955).
289. Cf. Brown v. Murdy, 78 S.D. 367, 102 N.W.2d 664 (1960) (loss of foot due to
negligence of two physicians).
290. E.g., Miller v. Northern Pac. R.R., 24 Idaho 567, 135 P. 845 (1913); Anderson v.
St. P. 8:S.S.M. Ry., 146 Minn. 430, 179 N.W. 45 (1920). Cf. Orton v. Virginia Carolina Chem.
Co., 142 La. 790, 77 So. 632 (1918).
291. W. PROSSER, supra note 257, at 316. See Arnst v. Estes, 136 Me. 272, 8 A.2d 201
(1939).
292. See text accompanying note 254 supra.
293. See text following note 263 supra.
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merely serve as the factual and legal background in which the reasonableness

of the final actor's conduct would be judged.
A related apportionment theory would place sole responsibility on any
subordinate level of government which might be said to have a duty to act with
due consideration for the laws and regulations of superior government entities.
For example, a city government might be held responsible if the taking occurred from the combined effect of state and city land-use restrictions. The
rationale would be that: (1) the state will not purposefully allow an unconstitutional taking of property to occur; (2) state laws have supremacy over
local ordinances; (3) even if the city action precedes passage of the state law,
the effect of the mtinicipal ordinance is to make the state law a contributing
factor in a taking of property; therefore, (4) the city ordinance must fail under
traditional supremacy concepts. If the city does not accept its obligation to
repeal the action, then the city must indemnify the state for any indirect liability the state may face for its unwilling part in the taking. This approach
would not be possible, of course, if the government entities causing the taking
were roughly equal in supremacy terms. In that situation, reliance would have
to be placed upon one of the alternative theories discussed in these pages.
A final method of apportionment is also possible. This theory would apportion responsibility on one of two alternative bases: the amount of injury
inflicted by each government or the amount of benefit received by each government. To be sure, difficult problems of proof would arise under either allocation method. Once a taking of property was proved, the responsible governments might be allowed to choose the methods by which they would jointly
alleviate the restrictions on the plaintiffs property. One alternative would be
for each government to contribute a portion of the money required to condemn the land. Ownership rights could then be divided or sold accordingly.
Another alternative would be for both governments to repeal their offending
laws. If repeal of the regulations of only one jurisdiction would prevent the
taking from occurring, one government might agree to repeal its law upon
receipt of compensation (representing the latter's share of responsibility for
the taking) from the other government. In the absence of agreement, the court
might order joint payment of compensation or repeal of both offending regulatory schemes.2 04 The exact relief ordered could be based upon the wishes of
the injured plaintiff or upon a balancing of the public interest and private
detriment involved in each alternative.
Burden of Proof. If joint and several liability is not imposed, the landowner may face serious problems in attempting to prove which governmental
entity should bear responsibility for his loss. The claimant's plight would be
less complex if he could utilize one of two tort concepts to shift the burden of
proof on the apportionment question to the defendants. The Restatement
(Second) of Torts"' offers two useful approaches, both requiring some finding
294. For cases indicating that the court would probably be unable to order a government
to extend municipal services to a given parcel of land, see note 255 supra.
295.

RSrATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTs

§433B (1965) (W. Prosser, Reporter).
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that the conduct of all defendants involved is tortious. In the taking context,
both levels of government can be held culpable after the taking occurs. Once
the owner loses all reasonable use of his property, even if the government
restrictions taken separately would not effect a taking, both governments
should have a duty to ensure relief.
The Restatement theory most analogous to the taking area is:29
Where the tortious conduct of two or more actors has combined to bring
about harm to the plaintiff, and one or more actors seeks to limit his
liability on the ground that the harm is capable of apportionment
among them, the burden of proof as to the apportionment is upon each
such actor.
The burden of proof in this situation is shifted to avoid the injustice of allowing a proved wrongdoer, who has in fact caused harm to the plaintiff, to
escape liability merely because another wrongdoer was also involved. "As between the proved tortfeasor who has clearly caused some harm, and the entirely innocent plaintiff, any hardship due to lack of evidence as to the extent
of the harm caused [by the single tortfeasor] should fall upon [the tortfeasor]."297

A related theory of shifting the burden of proof, set forth in the second
Restatement is applicable to situations in which harm has been caused by only
one of two or more tortious actors, but uncertainty exists as to which defendant
caused the harm. Under this approach, the burden is upon each defendant to
show that he did not cause the injury.29 8 For example, assume that both A and
B, independently hunting quail, negligently shoot at the same time in the direction of C. C is struck in the face by a single shot, which could have come
from either gun. In C's action against A and B, each of the defendants has
the burden of proving that the shot did not come from his gun. Any defendant
failing to meet this burden will be subject to liability for the harm to C. 9
This example is also helpful in the dual-level taking context. Consider the
situation in which on the same day two government entities pass separate regulations that together effect a taking of plaintiff's property. Each government
refuses to repeal its regulation. Assume that under a "final actor" apportionment standard only the government acting last would be liable for the taking.
Under the tort theory just noted, each government would be responsible for

296. Id. §433B(2).
297. Id. Comment on Subsection (2), at 444. A helpful example can be found in this
comment. Through the negligence of defendants A, B, and C, water escapes from irrigation

ditches on their land and floods part of D's farm. In D's action against A, B, and C, or any
one of them, each defendant has the burden of proving the extent to which his negligence
contributed to the damage caused by the flood, and if he does not do so is subject to liability for the entire damage to the farm. Id. illustration 7, at 445. See Katz, supra note 7, at

617 &n.63.
298. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, supra note 295, §433B(3).
299. Id. Comment on Subsection (3), Illustration 9, at 447. The example is apparently
taken from Summers v. Tice, 33 Cal. 2d 80, 199 P.2d 1 (1948). See Katz, supra note 7, at
616-17.
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proving that it in fact acted last. In the absence of such proof, joint and sev-

eral liability would be imposed.
A third method of shifting the burden of proof may be available in some
instances under a variation of the doctrine of Ybarra v. Spengard.00 In Ybarra,
the California supreme court held that the res ipsa loquitur requirement that
the injury inflicted must be caused by some agency within the defendant's exclusive control is subject to an exception. The court made the test one of "right
of control" rather than actual control where the purpose of the doctrine would
otherwise be defeated. The shift in burden of proof necessitated by the res ipsa
loquitur theory is invoked when the chief evidence of the true cause of a
culpable or innocent injury is practically accessible to the defendant, but inaccessible to the injured party.301
The doctrine was applied in Ybarra to a hospital operating room setting.
The court stated that where a plaintiff receives unusual injuries while unconscious and undergoing medical treatment, all the defendants having any
control over plaintiff's body or over instrumentalities that might have caused
the injuries may be required to meet the inference of negligence by explaining
their conduct. In the dual-level taking context, a landowner might rely upon
the Ybarra approach where the taking results from state and local regulations
and the state refuses to exercise its supremacy powers to negate the restrictive
effect of the local ordinance.
Final Thoughts on Apportionment. The various theories discussed indicate
that the problem of allocating responsibility for a multi-level taking should
not bar a plaintiff's request for relief. No single approach is recommended as
the only means of apportioning liability. Indeed, the apportionment theory
used in a given case may turn upon the compensation standard chosen to
prove the existence of an unconstitutional taking. Other allocation concepts
not discussed may also prove helpful. In sum, although the apportionment
issue should not block a claimant's cause of action, additional thought concerning this subject seems necessary.
CONCLUSION

Various types of governmental action can have essentially similar effects
upon a landowner's ability to utilize his property. Physical invasions, regula-

tory restrictions, and withholdings of government services can each prevent
an owner from making any reasonable use of his land. Once such a deprivation
of use occurs, the practical effect is a taking of property. Although any of the
six compensation theories discussed might be used to determine whether the
property owner should receive judicial relief, the loss-on-investment standard,
the Sax approach, and the cost internalization variation of the Dunham test

800. 25 Cal. 2d 486, 154 P.2d 687 (1944). See Katz, supra note 7, at 616-17.
301. 25 Cal. 2d at 493, 154 P.2d at 691. But cf. Madden v. Fulton County, 102 Ga. App.
19, 115 SX.2d 406 (1960).
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seem to be particularly helpful. Regardless of the compensation theory applied, however, the form of the governmental action should not be controlling.
Thus, that the taking of property is effected by regulatory action or the withholding of government services should not prevent judicial relief otherwise
dictated by general compensation theories. Similarly, that the denial of all
reasonable use results from the actions of several governmental entities should
not alone defeat an otherwise valid claim for relief. Although apportionment
of financial and administrative responsibility in such situations may raise
problems, adequate allocation theories can be developed.
The environmental regulation-utility restriction fact setting discussed in
this article offers a prime target for the application of each of these principles.
Delineating when a compensable taking of property occurs in such a context
would assist both the community and the property owner. The community
would be aided in assessing the full social costs of worthy environmental protection programs, while the owner would be assured that his property rights
will be protected to the full extent mandated by relevant constitutional provisions.
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